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> Maximizing possible futures rightfully ought be a mere subgoal or consequence of the actual prescriptions we care about. To play devil's advocate though, it
by smallnamespace 9y ago
> Maximizing possible futures rightfully ought be a mere subgoal or consequence of the actual prescriptions we care about.
To play devil's advocate though, it may be the case that our normal prescriptive preferences have the consequence of maximizing possible futures. E.g. 'attempt to survive' -> you will have future possibilities. It's possible that these are equivalent goals.
- eli_gottlieb 9y agoWell the case is that our normal prescriptive preferences don't maximize possible futures. That's actually what we mean by prescriptive: they remove weight from futures we don't actually like, and give it to those we do. We call them "preferences" because they prescribe a non-maximum entropy (constrained, nonuniform) distribution over future events.