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What's your threat model? If you don't care about metadata and you can exchange keys, use some form of symmetric encryption. If you care about metadata then thi
by adrianN 9y ago
What's your threat model? If you don't care about metadata and you can exchange keys, use some form of symmetric encryption. If you care about metadata then things are a lot more complicated.
But if you can assume that you have a secure channel for exchanging keys, you can just use that channel for communication.
- andai 9y agoConsider steganography.
- Retric 9y agoThere are latency issues. Suppose you meet up once to exchange CDs full of random data 20 years ago. Now you can exchange messages with newspaper adds secure in the knowledge nobody can ease drop even though your secure communication happened 30 years ago. Granted, this is limited to low bandwidth text, but you can leverage this for key exchange if you happen to trust some other form of crypto.
- Tinyyy 9y agoOf course, given that the CDs are kept securely or promptly destroyed upon use.
- dTal 9y agoYou can mitigate the metatdata leakage by posting your GPG-encrypted message on pastebin, over Tor. Address it by putting the title of the next message in the encrypted text. For bonus steno disguise the message as a GPG signing block for something boring.