Metzinger is not against creation of AI in general, but against creation of conscious AI. The argument is indeed very anthropomorphic, though this may be usefu

Metzinger is not against creation of AI in general, but against creation of conscious AI. The argument is indeed very anthropomorphic, though this may be useful to avoid human tendency to deny machines even a possibility of having a conscious experience. If anything, I would be more critical of its appeal to emotion than anthropomorphism. Argument about conscious Google spam is quite unfair and unwarranted. In fact, if you actually consider what Metzinger has to say about necessary conditions for consciousness (for example in "Being No One" or "The Ego Tunnel"), then obviously Google spam is nothing like that. Either way it seems to me that it may be better to err on the side of not making conscious AI in the first place rather than unintentionally making one with capacity to suffer. Especially that it may be non-obvious that it has capacity to experience pain. For example, we have already made this mistake by using curare alone as an anesthetic - presuming that a lack of automatic pain response, and ability to communicate feeling of pain means that one doesn't feel pain. That was a considerable misjudgment.