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> Internet service providers should never allow IP spoofing to be performed on their network. IP spoofing is the true root cause of the issue. See the infamous
by saurik 9y ago
> Internet service providers should never allow IP spoofing to be performed on their network. IP spoofing is the true root cause of the issue. See the infamous BCP38.
I don't see how it is at all reasonable to shift blame from a protocol that assumes the world can be trusted to the untraceable goal of "every single network in the entire world should only generate trusted data: then the problem would be solved".
> Internet providers should internally collect netflow protocol samples. The netflow is needed to identify the true source of the attack. With netflow it's trivial to answer questions like: "Which of my customers sent 6.4Mpps of traffic to port 1900?". Due to privacy concerns we recommend collecting netflow samples with largest possible sampling value: 1 in 64k packets. This will be sufficient to track DDoS attacks while preserving decent privacy of single customer connections.
OMFG. Do you want deanonymization attacks? Because this is how you get deanonymization attacks :/. The right form of solution here is not to encourage ISPs to log even more of our traffic (a practice I wish were illegal), but to try to kill off UPNP through every form of leverage possible (even if it breaks things).
I'd say this is "so disappointing", but I guess I shouldn't expect much from the company that tried its damndest to argue that nothing of importance was leaked from Cloudbleed even when you could still recover Grindr requests complete with IP addresses that they had managed to leak well after they tried to claim that data had been scrubbed :/.
- hueving 9y agoIP spoofing is the problem. Even if you completely ban UDP protocols, it still allows for anonymous unamplified attacks. Attacking every single protocol that dares to respond to a query is a pretty stupid approach IMO. Look how well it's worked so far. Additionally, unless we switch DNS to TCP only, root and authoritative name servers are always going to provide and amplification factor and there are still more than enough of them for devastating attacks. Agree with you about monitoring, but that wouldn't be necessary if we got serious about enforcing and blacklisting ISPs that drop the ball on BCP 38.
- yrro 9y agoWho are these ISPs? I would love to see a treemap apportioning blame to the worst offenders...
- lima 9y agoHard to tell unless you're a large ISP like CloudFlare that has direct routes to most of the internet.
- nikcub 9y agoThere is the spoofer project at CAIDA: https://spoofer.caida.org/summary.php https://spoofer.caida.org/summary.php 23% of the address space, about 33% of AS's. It has improved a lot but still some way to go
- hueving 9y agoThat's the problem, it's hard to trace spoofed IPs since they are spoofed.
- majke 9y agoYou commented on two points: A) ip spoofing B) netflow On IP spoofing I said plenty already https://idea.popcount.org/2016-09-20-strange-loop---ip-spoofing/ https://idea.popcount.org/2016-09-20-strange-loop---ip-spoof... . There are two major points: - We will always have DDoS vulnerable UDP protocols. In past we had DNS. Then we had NTP. Now we have SSDP. The next one is going to be some gaming protocol. We should fix them as we go, but a more comprehensive solution it to actually fight the spoofing. - Even without using amplification, with IP spoofing it's possible to launch a direct attack, which will be untraceable. We regularly see 150Mpps+ packet floods going _direct_ from the attackers to our servers. The ISP's are clueless. There is no way for anyone to trace the true source of the attack. (without netflow, that is) This brings us to second point - netflow. You say - the ISP's are incompetent, they do not have netflow and this is _good_. No it's not good. The ISP's can track you / deanonymize anyway, but when I ask them: "hey guys, I see this 150Mpps flood from your network, can you do something about it?" they say - "no, we can't identify the source because the IP's are spoofed". Yes, I herby recommend that each of the ISP's should take care of their network. Be able to answer historical questions about DDoS. That means the netflow collection point will have statistical metadata about customer connections (1 in 64k connections will have saved data - source port/ip, dest port/ip, length, packets, bytes). This might be used to attack your privacy - but the ISP can do much worse things anyway. Doing netflow right will allow us to finally trace the IP spoofing. I really think that DDoS is a threat to the internet as we know it. Think about centralization that it causes: can your server sustain trivial 100Gbps SSDP attack? I really think that doing netflow right will allow us to keep the decentralized internet.
- lima 9y agoQuestion for any network admins here: I enabled IPFIX on our Juniper MX series routers for that exact purpose, but it contains Layer 3 info only (no MAC addresses!). What am I missing? For now, I'm getting the info I need from sFlow but I want to get rid of that ASAP. You might be happy to hear that the ISP I work for can definitely identify where that 150Mpps flood came from :) We're even doing some automated outbound mitigation in order to be good net citizens. CloudFlare's blog articles definitely helped us improve our network-level DDoS mitigation, by the way! Thanks for that.
- dicknuckle 9y agoI agree. Lots of ISPs block outbound port 25 on their residential connections which I applaud.