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> ...just that desires are an inferior basis for decisions. Inferior in what sense? I don't see that there's any other sensible basis for the decisions we make

> ...just that desires are an inferior basis for decisions. Inferior in what sense? I don't see that there's any other sensible basis for the decisions we make, regardless of outcome. Adhering to a reasoned system of values sounds fundamentally like a driving desire in itself; some desires are simply less tangible than others.

saiya-jin 9y ago
Inferior to purely rational decisions not based on emotions? For me for example, it was switching countries for which I had no emotional desire, I knew it would be hard, I will lose bunch of friends, but in the long run, it will help me in many ways. I can hardly name this decision as desire to move. Looking back, I was more than 100% correct since it was probably best decision of my life despite all the drawbacks. But if I would listen only/mainly to my emotions, I would stay where I was before. The thing is, I can do many/most decisions in my life on purely rational level (or so I like to think). I don't see this behavior around me much, in fact it's pretty rare. Same goes for opinions and attitudes - emotions change, cold hard facts remain the same (I must sound very unemotional, which is not true at all - I just can separate the pleasure of enjoying emotions from them taking control and making me do stupid/irrational decisions... don't know how to describe it better).
deleted 9y ago
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klodolph 9y ago
I think what we have here is a semantic disagreement over the definition of "desire". It sounds like your position might be similar to Frankfurt's? So when I say that "desires are an inferior basis for decisions", maybe that could translate as, "desires not based on value systems are an inferior basis for decisions". And when you say that desires are the only sensible basis for decisions, it doesn't mean that any desire is a correct basis for a decision (that would be absurd), so the question of whether he "genuinely wanted to" becomes a question of what his "genuine" desires are. It's nigh impossible for me to figure out what my own genuine desires are, so I can't conceive that I'd be able to figure out what my father's genuine desires are, and I wouldn't take his explanation of his own desires at face value. When we absorb cultural values we internalize extrinsic motivation, so the fact that a particular desire is intrinsic rather than extrinsic is meaningless if we are trying to figure out if it is genuine.

saiya-jin 9y ago

Inferior to purely rational decisions not based on emotions? For me for example, it was switching countries for which I had no emotional desire, I knew it would be hard, I will lose bunch of friends, but in the long run, it will help me in many ways. I can hardly name this decision as desire to move. Looking back, I was more than 100% correct since it was probably best decision of my life despite all the drawbacks. But if I would listen only/mainly to my emotions, I would stay where I was before. The thing is, I can do many/most decisions in my life on purely rational level (or so I like to think). I don't see this behavior around me much, in fact it's pretty rare. Same goes for opinions and attitudes - emotions change, cold hard facts remain the same (I must sound very unemotional, which is not true at all - I just can separate the pleasure of enjoying emotions from them taking control and making me do stupid/irrational decisions... don't know how to describe it better).

deleted 9y ago

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klodolph 9y ago

I think what we have here is a semantic disagreement over the definition of "desire". It sounds like your position might be similar to Frankfurt's? So when I say that "desires are an inferior basis for decisions", maybe that could translate as, "desires not based on value systems are an inferior basis for decisions". And when you say that desires are the only sensible basis for decisions, it doesn't mean that any desire is a correct basis for a decision (that would be absurd), so the question of whether he "genuinely wanted to" becomes a question of what his "genuine" desires are. It's nigh impossible for me to figure out what my own genuine desires are, so I can't conceive that I'd be able to figure out what my father's genuine desires are, and I wouldn't take his explanation of his own desires at face value. When we absorb cultural values we internalize extrinsic motivation, so the fact that a particular desire is intrinsic rather than extrinsic is meaningless if we are trying to figure out if it is genuine.