8 ms·
Call me paranoid but I consider even a clean, freshly installed and fully updated Windows PC already compromised by the NSA.
by spiderfarmer 9y ago
Call me paranoid but I consider even a clean, freshly installed and fully updated Windows PC already compromised by the NSA.
- mikegerwitz 9y agoIt's compromised by Microsoft, who would willingly (and would be required to) cooperate with the NSA upon request.
- revmoo 9y agoYep, forced updates + NSL = they don't need 0days anymore.
- willstrafach 9y agoThat would never happen. A network tap would be able to detect a malicious update even if the main PC was implanted very well, and a Microsoft-signed malicious update would be worldwide news. Please correct me if I am wrong, but I don't think there has ever been a single instance of this actually occurring, only "this could possibly happen" theories. I am definitely interested to hear more if this is not the case.
- freeflight 9y ago>a Microsoft-signed malicious update would be worldwide news https://twitter.com/craiu/status/879690795946827776 https://twitter.com/craiu/status/879690795946827776 >only "this could possibly happen" theories Pre-Snowden a lot of things had been considered "could possibly happen" tinfoil hat theories, turned out a lot of them had not been mere theories.
- willstrafach 9y ago> https://twitter.com/craiu/status/879690795946827776 https://twitter.com/craiu/status/879690795946827776 1. That screenshot clearly shows the certificate is being treated as not valid. I assume it is being shared for IOC purposes. 2. I am referring to a software update, in the context of revmoo's "forced updates + NSL" comment. > Pre-Snowden a lot of things had been considered "could possibly happen" tinfoil hat theories, turned out a lot of them had not been mere theories. I could believe that is the case for those outside of the information security community, but nothing novel/tinfoil-hat-worthy was in the leaks, just confirmations of predictable sources/methods used for intelligence gathering and CNE work. Forcing a company to issue a blessed update containing malicious code is very different, and again, I am very interested to hear of any proof of such a thing occurring without detection (It doesn't seem possible for that to happen without it being detected and being discussed very loudly).
- throwawaymanbot 9y ago@willlstrafach, Nothing you have said convinces me the commentator you are replying to is wrong. Especially since an NSL would prevent ANYONE who detected anything from speaking about it. Updates that tweak code to introduce vulnerabilities, is not something thats science fiction.
- willstrafach 9y ago> Especially since an NSL would prevent ANYONE who detected anything from speaking about it Forced malicious updates would indeed be a reasonable concern if this was somehow actually the case. It is not, though, and I am not sure how that would even work. Are you saying that when it is detected, the government would somehow become aware of the detection and threaten the finder with an NSL before they could tell anyone?
- throwawaymanbot 9y agoJust because YOU cant figure out how it works, does not mean its not possible my friend. But I will say, that when you have a backdoor, and suddenly that backdoor stop providing intel/data/whatever, its usually a good indicator.
- willstrafach 9y agoI do not know what you mean by this. Again, my point was that any backdoor is highly unlikely to stay hidden.
- throwawaymanbot 9y agoI point out yet again, to the Yahoo Email debacle. Google it please.
- mikegerwitz 9y ago"That would never happen" doesn't fly as a security proof.
- willstrafach 9y agoI will concede that phrasing may be poor, better way to put it is that "forced updates + NSL" would result in detection and a media firestorm, giving absolutely no benefit and obliteration of any trust in Microsoft.
- mikegerwitz 9y agoIt's extremely risky to put out a mass update, yes. But if it were a targeted attack against an individual, the risk is greatly reduced, especially if that individual won't think twice about it. With that said, you do have individual targets that are suspicious (e.g. https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/ https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-ipho...). There's always risk.
- willstrafach 9y ago> It's extremely risky to put out a mass update, yes. But if it were a targeted attack against an individual, the risk is greatly reduced, especially if that individual won't think twice about it. At that point, you'd have to hope the target would not check the hashes of update files. If detected, then there is the same issue: A signed malicious update being detected (and easily verified cryptographically if given to a reporter) would cause a catastrophic media firestorm, eroding trust in the vendor forever. > With that said, you do have individual targets that are suspicious (e.g. https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-ipho... https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-ipho...). There's always risk. 0-day use against perceived "high value targets" is indeed a possibility and valid concern. No argument at all there.
- Programmatic 9y agoA signed malicious update would be a Big Deal(tm), but the entity would also be able to survive it by claiming it was negligence. I don't believe negligence has not been significantly penalized in the marketplace, aside from perhaps CAs where damage can be limited (prevent new certs from being seen as valid, plenty of other options for sites). There's no such option available for penalizing Microsoft, and their lock-in is significant enough to limit nuclear options for doing so. "We've revoked the signing key that was hacked by blah blah we have the utmost regard for security and adhered to best practices" and everyone would probably gloss over it for one instance.
- uep 9y ago> That would never happen. A network tap would be able to detect a malicious update even if the main PC was implanted very well, and a Microsoft-signed malicious update would be worldwide news. While I don't know of that specific scenario, Stuxnet used a hardware vendor's key to install infected drivers[1]. There was also a Chinese registrar that allowed a customer to man-in-the-middle Google[2]. Depending on how Windows organizes their driver updates, I could see an adversary doing a man-in-the-middle between Microsoft and their target, and pushing a bad driver update. 1. https://www.welivesecurity.com/2010/07/22/why-steal-digital-certificates/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2010/07/22/why-steal-digital-... 2. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140909/03424628458/china-using-man-in-the-middle-attack-against-google.shtml https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140909/03424628458/china...
- willstrafach 9y agoI am talking specifically about a malicious Microsoft-signed OS update in this context. I fully agree with you regarding general problems which could occur with PKI.
- zippoxer 9y agoDistrusting Windows was the wisest thing you did since you climbed off your horse. [1] No, seriously. How is it paranoia to think the NSA was/is surveilling your Windows installation if we already have proof that they have the means [2] and motivation [3] to do it at scale? [1] http://www.quotes.net/show-quote/34121 http://www.quotes.net/show-quote/34121 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EternalBlue https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EternalBlue [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program)
- willstrafach 9y agoThere is no proof of means or motivation to use 0-days at scale. In fact, using EternalBlue "at-scale" would have caused it to not stay a 0-day for very long.
- sillysaurus3 9y agoThat's not true. When an exploit shows up on a computer, "How did it get there?" is often the hardest question. There's no way to know short of capturing it in a lab environment. If you're talking about "at scale" being "the entire world," then yes. But usually the NSA tends to target their operations regionally, e.g. Iran.
- shallot_router 9y agoAny use of a zero-day risks burning it, and this was one of NSA's most potent zero-days. I imagine they used it rarely and wisely; probably trying other exploits first.
- rdiddly 9y agoAnd so now it's in the hands of people who have no such foresight. Which means soon it will be mitigated. Which means that despite all the pain right now, in the long run Wikileaks actually may end up having kind of helped humanity.
- HalfwayToDice 9y agoThis is absurd nonsense, but my viewpoint is a lonely one on HackerNews.
- yodon 9y agoYou're not the only one who thinks the idea of wearing a tin foil hat when you use Windows because the NSA only knows how to attack Windows is demeaning to the intelligence of other tin foil hat wearers.
- zanny 9y agoWhat should I trust more: A trade secret proprietary and obfuscated operating system from an organization known to collude with the government Or Code I have read in part, and know others read, and stand to believe that among all of us using those with the money or time would also audit Given, we are all on predominantly x86 computers with proprietary obfuscated control processors that can seize control of the system and do whatever they are told by the manufacturer / those the manufacturer gives access to, so the security is in general a whiff. Or more generally, don't use Linux for a false sense of security, because the security holes go much, much deeper than just the kernel and whats running on top of it, and Linux itself is nothing outstanding from a security architectural standpoint.
- yodon 9y agoFrom the phrasing of your question, I suspect we disagree on the answer to your theoretically rhetorical question. I don't care what people could or would like to audit with their free time, I care what people do audit with their actual time, generally because they are paid or have a financial motive to do. Windows is fuzzed, analyzed, traffic analyzed, attacked, and picked apart inside AND outside Microsoft with higher frequency and greater depth than Linux is, regardless of which happens to be open source and theoretically easier to examine. If Microsoft were to inject malicious stuff into Windows it would be found and reported and exploited. There is too much money, too much exploit opportunity, and too much security researcher brand cred available to anyone who discovers even a hint of malicious behavior on Microsoft's part for it to go unnoticed and unreported. And again, the point of the comment wasn't "Windows is secure" as nothing in tech is secure. The point was that someone who advocates wearing tinfoil hats around Windows to protect against the NSA while thinking Linux somehow gets a pass from those same bogeymen is not making a rational case for how to behave or what to fear.
- idlewords 9y agoYou're paranoid.
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