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Many years ago in a past life, I worked on the network security team at the University of Chicago. We had a similar policy (and they may still for all I know) o
by davidmr 9y ago
Many years ago in a past life, I worked on the network security team at the University of Chicago. We had a similar policy (and they may still for all I know) of just being able to requisition publicly routable IPs and run whatever you wanted on them with no default firewall rules applied at the border. Not for nothing did we call this a "target rich environment".
For all of the cool things I got to do (troubleshoot a breakin at the South Pole, send the RIAA a DMCA takedown notice when they stole our content (absolutely the highlight of my career), etc.), we spent the vast majority of our time on nonsense. We processed dumb breakins by the hundreds, had to enforce DMCA takedowns, and the like.
I'm also all for innovation and giving people the freedom to deploy services and innovate, but I would have killed to deploy all IPs by default behind NAT/firewalls and work with researchers to help them understand their responsibilities before giving them public IPs.
- Symbiote 9y ago> behind NAT/firewalls These are two separate things. There is no security difference between "route port 80 of one of our public IPs through to my NATted address" and "open port 80 for my public address". The public addresses are easier to administrate, troubleshoot, log, etc.
- davidmr 9y agoI agree. I meant the / to indicate that either one or a combination would have been helpful in different ways, but I certainly could have phrased it better.