4 ms·
Yes, but for a locked down OS version it should be possible to have administrator privileges denied to an application. So the Store could have a flag of which a
by SAI_Peregrinus 9y ago
Yes, but for a locked down OS version it should be possible to have administrator privileges denied to an application. So the Store could have a flag of which apps might need admin, and only those apps can be run as admin. This would prevent Word from being run as admin, since it certainly shouldn't have that flag.
- derefr 9y agoThe point of Task Manager here was that Word was being launched "directly"—the process was being spawned, outside of the framework that cares about concepts like "apps" or their security manifests. No matter how sandboxed you make your high-level abstraction layer, you can always just remove the sandbox by removing the abstraction layer. Docker (for example) won't protect you if you cd inside your Docker image and run a binary from it directly on the host. The only way to really "leak-proof" the abstraction here would be to build "apps" as a concept into the OS kernel itself, such that the exec/spawn syscall itself is responsible for doing the sandboxing and the OS's executable-binary format itself is responsible for containing the privilege manifest. So far, I haven't seen any OS interested in taking steps in that direction, though (which is odd, given that a similar conceit—code-signature verification—was embedded into said syscall in every OS quite recently.)