4 ms·
I would not object to the idea that companies should be held liable for critical faults which get exploited. It was the suggestion that Schneier gave several ye
by belorn 9y ago
I would not object to the idea that companies should be held liable for critical faults which get exploited. It was the suggestion that Schneier gave several years ago in order for security funding to be financially sound. However we very far from this reality, where its questionable if companies can be held liable for security faults in extreme cases like voting machines, airplane systems, and medical devices. I recall reading that Schneier more or less given up on it.
We need to get to a point where people in power positions are held responsible for the damages caused by government developed malware that is used in maleware like wannacry. That is hard to do without the issue rising on the political agenda.
- mindslight 9y ago> its questionable if companies can be held liable for security faults in extreme cases like voting machines, airplane systems, and medical devices > We need to get to a point where people in power positions are held responsible You're contradicting yourself. If it's possible to hold people in power responsible for what a single agency under them does (not even requiring their knowledge!), then it's certainly possible to hold them responsible for approving public use of insecure voting machines! (especially at a more local political level) And if it's not possible to hold people in power responsible (which is a reasonable assumption), then the philosophy of distributed defense becomes even more important! > the damages caused by government developed malware Attempts to silence messengers never end well. And I don't think that changes, even and especially when the messenger is a well funded government. But normalizing that philosophy certainly sets the stage to silence demonize smaller messengers!
- ethbro 9y agoThe problem with holding manufacturers liable is that I'm not sure it's the economically optimal solution. Fundamentally, let's break down exploits into two categories: 1) Shoddy programming creates exploit that is obvious to manufacturer (let's say Chinese Android TV stick makers) 2) Exploit exists despite manufacturer's efforts otherwise (let's say Microsoft) Putting exploit risk on software companies solves #1. But, especially in critical industries, balloons the cost of their systems due to #2, because they must now cover a risk they can't even model (unknown unknown). Can you imagine what accountants and actuaries would do with "You may have a nation state targeting the firmware controller in an HDD to compromise your system"? I think a more optimal situation would be the government mandating liability for known-problematic code standard lapses, but then providing a liability shield provision if the manufacturer can deliver a fix to a critical vulnerability in X days. Ideally, we'd want any legislation to do two things that solve both of the above problems. Increase adherence to generally accepted secure coding standards (helps #1) and increase ability to deliver a timely fix to customers (aka codebase maintenance and agility; helps #2 and especially important in mass-use IoT devices).
- runeks 9y ago> The problem with holding manufacturers liable is that I'm not sure it's the economically optimal solution Either you hold someone liable or the effect will just be hiding the risk. How about just requiring that the use of critical software systems be ensured against malware/failure in general? Seems like we want that anyway, and if we can't find anyone to insure a piece of software, it probably shouldn't be used in a critical system in the first place. Importantly, it's the users of software in critical systems alone that need to be insured. Neither software vendors nor regular users need insurance. The insurance company, alone, should handle the job of shielding a critical system from the mistakes of software vendors. We need to allow software vendors to be able to make mistakes, or nothing would get made, ever (source: I'm a programmer). And the insurer would be wise to spend some of the premium on bug bounties for the software they're ensuring (to minimize the cost of failure). In the end, all white hats would end up being employed by an insurance company, helping assess software security.
- ethbro 9y agoDid you read the rest of my comment?
- runeks 9y agoThe difference between your approach and mine is that you propose to solve it by making rules (regulations), as opposed to adding a separate party that can absorb risk (insurance), thus shielding a creative industry -- software development -- from adhering to a list of rules, which surely will only grow in size.
- ethbro 9y agoAh. Insurance doesn't act as a separate party to absorb risk in the way you're talking about. They act as a party to amortize known risk, in exchange for a monetary premium set based on that known risk. Without the government stepping in and limiting catastrophic liability to some degree (ideally in exchange for signaling the market to produce a social good), the premiums changed would be so large as to just suck money out of tech. There's no creativity shield if you're paying an onerous amount of your profits in exchange. Which is why I said any solution has to be two part: (1) require risk liability on a better-defined subset of risk & (2) provide a liability shield on the remaining less-defined risk iff a company demonstrates an ability to handle it (aka prompt patching). This creates a modelable insurance risk market, therefore reasonable premiums, and still does something about nation-state level attacks.