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> I'm not getting why this is suppose to be "hard". Because that's not what's hard. Explaining the physical processes of the brain is very, very difficult for
by andrepd 9y ago
> I'm not getting why this is suppose to be "hard".
Because that's not what's hard. Explaining the physical processes of the brain is very, very difficult for the brain is an extremely complex machine (one could say, bar aliens, it is probably the most complex object in the universe). But it's surely not "hard" in a fundamental level. We know the rules of physics applicable to physical systems like the brain. Technically we were able to image it at a very high resolution, and if we had massive computers to solve the equations, we could explain everything going on in the brain. It's difficult, but not "hard".
Yet this would bring us no closer to explaining the subjective conscious experience. Despite the fact that we know it exists, because we experience it, we have no idea how to measure it, how to explain, and why on earth it arises in this specific physical arrangement of atoms called the brain. A computer chip is also very complex, and integrates information. Is it conscious? We don't know and we will never know because any other consciousness other than ours is fundamentally inaccessible. In other words, this is a "hard" problem.
- ppod 9y agoI don't see any advance in this debate since things that Dennett and Hofstadter wrote 20+ years ago (both independently and in their co-authored book "The Mind's I"). Is it really surprising that we have a first person subjective experience? We know that we are incredibly complex things, constantly integrating and acting on very complicated external stimuli. Such a system should have references to its own body and its own neural states, its train of reasoning should frequently include itself, its focus will drift forward and backwards in time... this is just how a system like this would work. If the system communicates about its state then its language should have referents to these internal states, referents like "experience", and "feels like", and "I understand". Is that surprising? Wouldn't it be surprising if it wasn't like that? I think that Tononi's approach is a good approximation, but it can't be a full solution because the word 'consciousness' is too anthropocentric. One criticism of IIT showed that a seemingly uninteresting complex artificial system could have a very high IIT complexity quotient. The problem is that the things we use to define the term 'consciousness' are things that can be approximated to varying degrees by chimps or dolphins or generative adversarial networks or antfarms or thermometers. But behind our use of the word 'consciousness' there is still almost always a very slightly disguised dualism that uses it as a substitute for the word 'soul'.
- andrepd 9y agoRE: second paragraph. But that explains, for example, the physical phenomenon of language. A complex system has reference points to itself, and structures in the brain organize to speak about things, including about itself, using terms like "experience" and "feels like, etc". But it does not explain the conscious "internal" phenomenon of language, of preparing a speech, of grasping for words, etc. See what I mean? Like p-zombies. Someone else describes their stream-of-consciousness. But that speech, those patterns in the brain, etc, are but a physical phenomenon. They tell us nothing about the subjective conscious experience. We could have a robot not have consciousness and replicate that speech the same.
- ppod 9y agoI don't see at all. You're just putting the word 'conscious' in italics. What I said was not only about language, language the reason we have words like 'conscious' and 'experience'. Why do we have the experience? It doesn't make sense to me to suggest that we wouldn't. Dynamic processing of internal representations and input is what intelligent systems do, ants, bats, chimps, and deep neural networks do it. Those processes obviously exist, and you call your own process your subjective conscious experience.
- eli_gottlieb 9y ago>Technically we were able to image it at a very high resolution, and if we had massive computers to solve the equations, we could explain everything going on in the brain. That wouldn't explain the brain any more than simulating a car's engine at a molecular level explains the Carnot Cycle.