4 ms·
With every leak of government produced malware I hope the issue get pushed a bit further onto the political agenda so a international treaty can be reached on s
by belorn 9y ago
With every leak of government produced malware I hope the issue get pushed a bit further onto the political agenda so a international treaty can be reached on software implemented weapons. There need to be some defined limits for what agencies can do and what happens when the weapons sooner or later are discovered and turned into problems like WannaCry.
Its clear to most politicians that its a problem if criminals use guns acquired from the military or police, and that its partial the fault of those agencies when it happens. We are not there yet with malware.
- lyle_nel 9y agoI don't disagree with you on any particular point. However, who do you suppose we trust to decide what is a software implemented weapon and what is not? Of course there are very clear black and white examples, but the in between is where we should be concerned. Consider the USA stance on export of encryption as a historical example of where it can go terribly wrong.
- JumpCrisscross 9y agoWhat is your proposed test? Detecting a nuclear explosion or traces of chemical-weapons manufacturing is easy compared to figure out who made some malware component.
- mindslight 9y agoYour diagnosis is at odds with the basis of open security. The primary thing that needs to happen is an accepting of responsibility by those who administer critical systems. Mathematically, what we call a developed "exploit" is really just an existence proof that something is already insecure (hence "PoC or GTFO"). The blame needs to be properly assigned to the developers/integrators of these systems for negligence (currently gross negligence - eg relying on Turing-complete languages) instead of scapegoating those who discover the emperor has no clothes, even despite their underlying motivations and lack of full disclosure. Nasty exploits have always existed - the worrisome development is the scale of execution brought on by entities with such resources, and the trend of governments becoming overtly adversarial against the people, both their own citizens and foreign individuals. Even if it were practical (see: China's attitude to imaginary property), having these entities form treaties (ie collude) with one another is not going to resolve this. If anything, treaties will form gentleman's agreements between allies, while enshrining the attacking individuals "of interest" as standard procedure.
- avar 9y agoEven if a lot of the vulnerable machines still run insecure software there's just no reason why they all need to be networked as they are now. E.g. medical machines at the NHS running Windows recently got ransomware'd. There's no intrinsic reason for why these machines need to be connected to even an internal network other than lazyness prioritizing convenience over security.
- beager 9y agoBut to revisit the analogy about stolen police/military arms, are we to blame casualties/victims of these stolen arms for not being able to defend themselves? Yes, those tasked with network and infrastructure security should be held to rigorous and constantly increasing standards. But there has to be some accountability from the state purveyors of this malware when it gets intercepted and weaponized. Publication of these tools is one way to help in lieu of that, but it becomes a toss-up as to whether the world will harden against published malware before bad actors, state-sponsored or otherwise, weaponized it for their own gain.
- mindslight 9y agoThere is a world of difference between physical and informational security, so it is an improper analogy. First, it is possible to perfectly defend (and conversely, a vulnerability means one is entirely vulnerable. Don't confuse mitigations that affect the probability of being vulnerable with actually being vulnerable. There is no middle ground as to whether something is secure or not, it is a binary proposition!) Second, attacks are practically free and untraceable. And all the status-quo anonymity-destroying attempts cannot actually change this, as making "network identity" trusted would mean changing every system's attack surface into every other system - eg break a single person's credit card and use Starbucks wifi.
- belorn 9y agoI would not object to the idea that companies should be held liable for critical faults which get exploited. It was the suggestion that Schneier gave several years ago in order for security funding to be financially sound. However we very far from this reality, where its questionable if companies can be held liable for security faults in extreme cases like voting machines, airplane systems, and medical devices. I recall reading that Schneier more or less given up on it. We need to get to a point where people in power positions are held responsible for the damages caused by government developed malware that is used in maleware like wannacry. That is hard to do without the issue rising on the political agenda.
- DougN7 9y agoI hope this helps the politicians realize encryption back doors can never be made safe. If even the NSA can't keep their top secret tools safe, generic 'law enforcement' surely won't be able to either.