4 ms·
I'm not sure these are so dangerous as all that. I see some server and client crashes, but nothing that'd allow transparent MITM, RCE, or the like. Perhaps ther
by throwanem 9y ago
I'm not sure these are so dangerous as all that. I see some server and client crashes, but nothing that'd allow transparent MITM, RCE, or the like. Perhaps there's something I have missed, and if so I hope someone more knowledgeable here will point it out - but right now I don't intend to stop using OpenVPN, because even if it's possible that a malicious network might crash the VPN stack on my phone or similar, that's still preferable to sending unprotected traffic over an untrusted network. If my VPN clients die, at least I know something's up!
- mkj 9y agoA double-free can traditionally allow remote code execution. Maybe modern libc mitigations will protect you, maybe not.
- throwanem 9y agoFair point. But it looks like the scope on that one is pretty limited: > There are several issues in the extract_x509_extension() function in ssl_verify_openssl.c. This function is called if the user has used the ‘x509-username-field’ directive in their configuration. That option, per [1], appears to exist in order to support odd TLS certificates that don't use the CN field as an identifier, and is also behind a configure #define that appears not to be enabled by default. So that, if I'm reading this right, is a pretty narrow attack surface in general - not inconsiderable, to be sure, but something of a corner case. [1] https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/attachment/ticket/124/0001-Documented-x509-username-field-option.patch https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/attachment/ticket/124/...