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Yeah. The webpage is remote and using ssl and now wants to talk to the locally installed app. I agree that SSL doesn’t make sense there and honestly, in my opi
by pilif 9y ago
Yeah. The webpage is remote and using ssl and now wants to talk to the locally installed app.
I agree that SSL doesn’t make sense there and honestly, in my opinion it would make sense for browsers to treat localhost as a secure origin.
But they don’t and so we’re back to square one which is that a secured origin can’t make requests to a non secured origin.
Update: newer browsers do in-fact do this. It’s also part of the WHATWG spec: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-mixed-content/commit/349501cdaa4b4dc1e2a8aacb216ced58fd316165 https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-mixed-content/commit/349501...
Of course there’s still IE and Edge that are of different minds, but it’s nice to see movement
- derefr 9y agoInteresting; intuitively, I would say that this should be fine for mobile browsers, but desktop browsers shouldn't be doing this—PC operating systems are still built on a fundamentally "mutually-untrustworthy multitenant time-sharing system" paradigm. Any random port on localhost (or, indeed, on any other IP assigned to the loopback interface—that's 127/8 in IPv4, you know!) can be a socket opened by a process running on your PC that was started by someone who 1. has limited shell access to your machine, but 2. who isn't you. Privileging such ports would give such attackers an easy escalation path from this limited shell access to administrative access, assuming that you yourself are a [local or domain] administrator. Mobile devices can ignore this because they're (so far) inherently single-user devices. But anything allowing multiple parallel user sessions—even a Chromebook, or an iPad in Classroom mode—shouldn't make the assumption that local ports are safe. That's how a teacher gets their password phished by their students.