5 ms·
> What more can I do to be safe? • Work from an standard (non-admin) user account. • Review the settings in System Preferences » Security & Privacy and pick a
by Razengan 9y ago
> What more can I do to be safe?
• Work from an standard (non-admin) user account.
• Review the settings in System Preferences » Security & Privacy and pick a reasonable ground between convenience and security.
• At the very least, "Require an administrator password to access system-wide preferences" (found under the "Advanced..." button.)
• Be wary of any third-party app that asks for an administrator password, and try to see if it runs after denying the prompt. Dropbox, for example, seems to work fine even if I cancel its second (after installation) admin prompt. (There were news about it faking the prompt and storing your macOS password [2] for automatic updates...)
• You may want to tighten the firewall settings, and/or consider Little Snitch [3].
• If you have to install something from a .pkg file, which can autorun scripts, try to review the .pkg and its scripts with Pacifist [0] first. It may be possible to just extract the payload with Pacifist and run the app just fine without "installing" the .pkg.
• Make regular backups. Automatic (e.g. Time Machine) AND manual (of your most important stuff at least.)
• Don’t use the same passwords for different things.
• Enable multi-factor authentication on as many services as you can.
• Visit dodgy websites in private browsing mode, or a secondary, locked-down browser like Tor [1].
• If you can't help downloading pirated/"cracked" apps or games, try to run them from a different user account.
• If concerned about outright theft of your Mac, enable FileVault full disk encryption, and set a firmware password. [4]
• Whenever you're bored or something is acting janky, check the usual places where third-party processes can install themselves and hook into your system:
- System Preferences » Security & Privacy » Privacy » Accessibility
- System Preferences » Users & Groups » Login Items
- /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /System/Library/LaunchDaemons, /System/Library/StartupItems
- /Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchDaemons, /Library/StartupItems, /Library/Internet Plug-Ins
- Check for 3rd-party kernel extensions:
kextstat -kl | awk ' !/apple/ { print $6 $7 } '
• Oh and before you paste any command/script (like the above) from the internet into your terminal, see the man page for each command and its arguments first. :)
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I've used Macs without an antivirus since 2012 and I haven't been hit by malware yet... I think. :)
[0] http://www.charlessoft.com http://www.charlessoft.com
[1] https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en
[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12463338 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12463338 (How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac)
[3] https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html
[4] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204455 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204455
- rocky1138 9y ago> At the very least, turn the firewall on It's amazing how many Mac owners have this turned off. Why?
- Razengan 9y agoIt’s off by default..
- rocky1138 9y agoWhy?
- Razengan 9y ago┐(°—°)┌ I'm not sure, but maybe simply turning the firewall on in macOS doesn't provide any benefit if everything else is fine, and you have to lock it down and disallow all requests by default to actually get added security through it. Edited the recommendation after reading the sibling comments.
- anfedorov 9y agoBecause it's annoying and it doesn't help — most people don't care for managing a firewall, nor should they. If an attacker has run an executable on your laptop, whether you block it from phoning home or not is hardly your main concern.
- flukus 9y agoYou don't run a firewall to prevent a compromised system from dialing out, you run it to prevent other compromised systems on the network from dialing in. Everyone on the same wifi network is an attack vector.
- anfedorov 9y agoGood point. Most importantly, that's the far less annoying use-case: one can imagine a simple UX with a list of applications bound to LISTEN on an external interface for you to whitelist for an hour, a day, or indefinitely. I think browser exploits are still a slightly more common attack vector, but that's certainly an option.