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'Crash Override': Malware That Took Down a Power Grid
- Pfhreak 9y agoWeird name collision with the Crash Override Network and Zoe Quinn's book. I'm curious about the provenance of the name, as the article seems to suggest the security researchers provided the name. [Edit]: I show my cultural ignorance -- it appears both are likely a reference to Hackers, based on the responses below.
- rangersanger 9y agoI immediately thought of Dade "Zero Cool" Murphy and Acid Burn. And Angelina Jolie...
- jagermo 9y agoDepends on how many systems it crashed, I would say
- alschwalm 9y agoMaybe a reference to the protagonist from Hackers: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0113243/ http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0113243/
- Sunset 9y agoA "developer" who calls messing around with a WSWYG html editor "game development" decides to crib an iconic name from the hacker ethos. Of course there will be collisions.
- zitterbewegung 9y agoComprehensive white paper gives you more information and context [1]. Looking at it it has 4 payloads and targets systems made by Siemens [2]. [1] https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Wi... [2] http://w3.siemens.com/smartgrid/global/en/products-systems-solutions/protection/pages/overview.aspx http://w3.siemens.com/smartgrid/global/en/products-systems-s...
- erentz 9y agoControl systems are so ridiculously insecure given what they do. I was lucky enough to attend a DHS control systems security summit at INL way back in 2006 (or 2007 I can't remember). They had a huge lab full of various PLCs, etc, and a bunch of surprisingly smart folks working on pen-testing them. But still, it's a decade later and we don't seem to have made much progress.
- abricot 9y agoIt's a decade later and the new secure versions still havent been installed in Ukrainian power stations...
- zfdrdg 9y agoAre you just assuming new secure versions exist that could be used? I work with industrial control but mainly Rockwell not siemens and I don't know of any PLC communication protocol that supports any kind of encryption but I want to hear about any options that do exist.
- snerbles 9y ago> But still, it's a decade later and we don't seem to have made much progress. Despite all the "IIoT" buzzwords their marketing may spout, industrial vendors operate a decade behind the software curve at best. Arcane proprietary stacks running atop XP, CE, ActiveX, and various flavors of DOS are still getting deployed in new industrial installations...often supported by vendors staffed by a hundred salescritters to every engineer, if they're lucky enough to have any staff remaining that wrote or understand the original product in the first place. It's filled with dozens of mini-Oracles, each with licensing more insane than the next because your typical integrator will either run for the hills at the first sign of anything that isn't ladder logic or spew forth spaghetti garbage that makes INTERCAL look like the most pretentiously elegant Lisp. When you're the lone programmer on the team that even knows what Git is, you start to realize why nobody ever got fired for just buying Rockwell.
- evdev 9y ago
- jumpkickhit 9y agoDo these infrastructures really need the level of hardware they seem to use? Rather than use a unsecured raspberry pi3 with it's wifi left on, why not have a closed system specifically built instead. Something not casually running embedded Windows XP, rather maybe a barebones OS written in assembly with minimal networking functionality on minimal hardware.
- lucaspiller 9y agoI suspect the actual cause is similar to the fuel station hacks from a couple of years ago [0], where industrial control systems have been 'upgraded' to run over the internet. [0] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/11/anonymous_hacks_fuel_station_monitoring_system/ https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/11/anonymous_hacks_fue...
- problems 9y agoBuilding on commodity hardware is cheap, easy, quick to develop and often more stable and secure. Going fully custom results in more custom components which are often less tested and less audited than their commodity counterparts. Yes, it sounds like they'll be "simple" but it rarely is so - especially when your boss or sales team asks why you don't have IP-based monitoring. The best bet in my opinion is to use commodity stuff but reduce the attack surface as much as possible by simply disabling, firewalling and physically restricting everything possible. In many cases like this, you could probably get away with absolutely minimalist control systems run on microcontrollers and similar with monitoring only over an isolated unidirectional interface (think fiber optic connection with no physical receiver on the other side).
- evdev 9y agoThe whole area is heavily, heavily reactionary and slow moving. They're on embedded XP because that's the closest they can get given the software platforms they're dependent on. You're right that locked down embedded industrial (Linux) PCs are the best option, but your control platform has to run on them...
- InclinedPlane 9y ago
- evdev 9y agoThis, from a former coworker, might give you a good sense of the state of things: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPWKJR6IVfA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPWKJR6IVfA
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]