The reason is that SGX doesn't do remotely the same thing that AMT and ME do. Code that uses SGX doesn't gain privileges it didn't have (in fact, it loses privi

The reason is that SGX doesn't do remotely the same thing that AMT and ME do. Code that uses SGX doesn't gain privileges it didn't have (in fact, it loses privileges even compared to normal usermode code). It can be scheduled/killed by the OS the same as any other user code, and the feature can be disabled wholesale via firmware (the processor will not shutdown after 30 minutes like it does when ME is prevented from running). The code running in the enclave is also not encrypted; only data it generates at runtime is, so you can inspect it and decide whether you want to run it just fine. Kernels can't even use it directly, so I'm not sure how SGX helps anybody "make all the decisions for you". In fact, SGX is probably the only way to get some semblance of a defense against compromised ME and SMM code. There's even a number of open source projects that use it (e.g. [0]). To be even more dramatic, not every acronym Intel comes up with is Pure Evil. [0]: https://github.com/ayeks/TresorSGX https://github.com/ayeks/TresorSGX