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The US continues, today, to be the only first-strike nuclear nation threatening to (as an explicit policy) destroy civilian population centers in a host of comp

The US continues, today, to be the only first-strike nuclear nation threatening to (as an explicit policy) destroy civilian population centers in a host of competitor countries as a coercive tactic and if and when it serves US national interest. The further continuation of this longstanding policy, which is in effect today, is a matter of debate - though there has not yet been a strong enough coalition of opinion to withdraw this doctrine. There were several nuclear strike target lists leaked from the past several administrations and they all say the same thing: capitols and population centers of compeditors, strike first in scenarios where not striking could put the US at a serious competitive disadvantage, use the threat of a strike and the deterrent of weapons of mass destruction as a coercive measure in the toolbox of statecraft.

mikeash 9y ago
Is official policy important? If China or Russia or whoever decide one day that they need to make a first strike against population centers, it's not like they're going to say, "oh, I wish we could, but we can't, it's against policy."
- jwtadvice 9y ago
  Yes official policy is important. This is for several reasons: 1. Official policy communicates expectations. Others derive their behavior from, in large part, the official positions of others. 2. Official policy provides a mechanism of commitment. It is difficult to withdraw from or engage in something that is against public and officially stated policy (in both domestic politics and international relations). 3. Official policy is a mechanism to inform and constrain other national choices. It is difficult to have multiple official policies that clearly contradict, such as having an official policy of dismantling all nuclear arsenals at the same time as having an official policy to provide a nuclear umbrella over protectorates. When administrations transition and when new staff come into security planning, their choices on other policies are constrained by existing policies. 4. Cultivating an expectation that official policy is a good predictor of behavior provides a strong signaling function to other states, and for the building of statecraft. Countries that have no credibility often have none because of their misalignment of actions and official policy. But yes, nations do sometimes decide to change policy or act against their policy. In the case of Russia or China as you've written in the above comment it is very highly unlikely for a large number of reasons. But it remains possible in slim margins, sure, and could be fun to speculate about.
cmiles74 9y ago
The book "Command and Control" spends a good amount of time on this plan. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_awdb_G.gozbX6FFHGH https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_awdb_G.g...
emmab 9y ago
> The US continues, today, to be the only first-strike nuclear nation threatening to (as an explicit policy) destroy civilian population centers in a host of competitor countries as a coercive tactic and if and when it serves US national interest. Doesn't the Geneva convention disallow terrorism? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Geneva_Convention#Collective_punishments https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Geneva_Convention#Colle... Does this mean that if anyone actually carried out an order like this they could be prosecuted for war crimes? Is it illegal to make or disseminate plans for war crimes if one hasn't carried them out yet?
- user982 9y ago
  International law does not apply to the US. When the Hague found the United States guilty of attacking and violating Nicaragua's sovereignty, the US simply refused to comply with the ruling and the issue was subsequently dropped.[1] > Is it illegal to make or disseminate plans for war crimes if one hasn't carried them out yet? Apparently not.[2] [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_v._United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_v._United_States [2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_Operations_in_Guerrilla_Warfare https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_Operations_in_Gu...
- douche 9y ago
  The Geneva Convention is only useful so long as the people with the big guns choose to uphold it. In many respects, it is a relic of early-modern limited war doctrines and archaic aristocratic sensibilities.
scottLobster 9y ago
Yes, because we've totally just been nuking or threatening to nuke anyone who looked at us cross-eyed for the last few decades... /s Your nomenclature is a bit hyperbolic. "competitor countries" in the nuclear context mean "countries that threaten us with nuclear war", "coercive tactic" and "when it serves the US national interest" correspondingly means "threatening nuclear war to dissuade existential threats", and "competitive disadvantage" means "being on the losing side of a nuclear exchange". We can debate what the official policy should or should not say but please don't take the terms out of context to make them sound scary, it really detracts from your argument.
- jwtadvice 9y ago
  First. Strawman. Not helpful. I actually lifted the nomenclature directly from National Security experts. I did not invent or distort any of the nomenclature. Further, it is a very accurate representation of the terminology and nomenclature. The point I hope to drive home is that 70 years later the same "chilling" (title word, not mine) is in effect. > "competitor countries" in the nuclear context mean "countries that threaten us with nuclear war" No. If you look at the list of target nations they include non-nuclear countries (Syria, Iran, etc). > "coercive tactic" and "when it serves the US national interest" correspondingly means "threatening nuclear war to dissuade existential threats" Mostly wrong. An existential threat could be an economic or political existential threat, or it could be conventional. And it can also be used (IS used) for non-existential coercion: say defending an ally. > "competitive disadvantage" means "being on the losing side of a nuclear exchange". No. It means facing a large risk of losing in a conflict of some kind for which there is a large interest in the US of winning. This does not apply only to nuclear exchange and indeed National Security practitioners are quite keen to discuss "cross-domain" warfare (lawfare, sanctions, political entanglement, etc). > We can debate what the official policy should or should not say but please don't take the terms out of context to make them sound scary You've taken the terms out of context. I hope I didn't make them sound scary. I mean, reality is a bit scary some times but I wrote that as quite matter-of-fact.
  - gozur88 9y ago
    >If you look at the list of target nations they include non-nuclear countries (Syria, Iran, etc). US policy is to respond to non-nuclear WMD attacks with nuclear weapons, and it's a good policy. Because otherwise we would need to develop and maintain large stocks of chemical and biological weapons if the policy was to respond to WMD with the same kind of WMD.
DigDugDoug 9y ago
But what's the problem with this doctrine from the perspective of a nation-state actor? I'm being purposely obtuse with the question but I think to some extent the doctrine does make sense. It's too late to convince the world that having nuclear weapons isn't diplomatically advantageous, that cat has been out of the box for awhile. Any risks associated with having nuclear weapons tend to occur prior to their successful development which creates the risk/reward dynamic. In realist terms, other nations aren't really an American problem until they detract from American interests both material and diplomatic. I'm focusing on the US because that's where your criticism was centered but I'm of the opinion that this philosophy could be applied to any given nation albeit with altered strategic considerations.
- jwtadvice 9y ago
  It's interesting. I did not mean this comment as criticism (as you suggest). I'm merely accounting that the point of the article ("in the 1950s, the US policies on use of nuclear forces was startling - to our sensibilities - in how it exercised them for power in pragmatic, utilitarian ways") equally applies today.
jwhitlark 9y ago
The most recent nuclear policy I can find for the US rules this out. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Posture_Review https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Posture_Review

mikeash 9y ago

Is official policy important? If China or Russia or whoever decide one day that they need to make a first strike against population centers, it's not like they're going to say, "oh, I wish we could, but we can't, it's against policy."

jwtadvice 9y ago
Yes official policy is important. This is for several reasons: 1. Official policy communicates expectations. Others derive their behavior from, in large part, the official positions of others. 2. Official policy provides a mechanism of commitment. It is difficult to withdraw from or engage in something that is against public and officially stated policy (in both domestic politics and international relations). 3. Official policy is a mechanism to inform and constrain other national choices. It is difficult to have multiple official policies that clearly contradict, such as having an official policy of dismantling all nuclear arsenals at the same time as having an official policy to provide a nuclear umbrella over protectorates. When administrations transition and when new staff come into security planning, their choices on other policies are constrained by existing policies. 4. Cultivating an expectation that official policy is a good predictor of behavior provides a strong signaling function to other states, and for the building of statecraft. Countries that have no credibility often have none because of their misalignment of actions and official policy. But yes, nations do sometimes decide to change policy or act against their policy. In the case of Russia or China as you've written in the above comment it is very highly unlikely for a large number of reasons. But it remains possible in slim margins, sure, and could be fun to speculate about.

cmiles74 9y ago

The book "Command and Control" spends a good amount of time on this plan. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_awdb_G.gozbX6FFHGH https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_awdb_G.g...

emmab 9y ago

> The US continues, today, to be the only first-strike nuclear nation threatening to (as an explicit policy) destroy civilian population centers in a host of competitor countries as a coercive tactic and if and when it serves US national interest. Doesn't the Geneva convention disallow terrorism? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Geneva_Convention#Collective_punishments https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Geneva_Convention#Colle... Does this mean that if anyone actually carried out an order like this they could be prosecuted for war crimes? Is it illegal to make or disseminate plans for war crimes if one hasn't carried them out yet?

user982 9y ago
International law does not apply to the US. When the Hague found the United States guilty of attacking and violating Nicaragua's sovereignty, the US simply refused to comply with the ruling and the issue was subsequently dropped.[1] > Is it illegal to make or disseminate plans for war crimes if one hasn't carried them out yet? Apparently not.[2] [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_v._United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_v._United_States [2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_Operations_in_Guerrilla_Warfare https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_Operations_in_Gu...
douche 9y ago
The Geneva Convention is only useful so long as the people with the big guns choose to uphold it. In many respects, it is a relic of early-modern limited war doctrines and archaic aristocratic sensibilities.

scottLobster 9y ago

Yes, because we've totally just been nuking or threatening to nuke anyone who looked at us cross-eyed for the last few decades... /s Your nomenclature is a bit hyperbolic. "competitor countries" in the nuclear context mean "countries that threaten us with nuclear war", "coercive tactic" and "when it serves the US national interest" correspondingly means "threatening nuclear war to dissuade existential threats", and "competitive disadvantage" means "being on the losing side of a nuclear exchange". We can debate what the official policy should or should not say but please don't take the terms out of context to make them sound scary, it really detracts from your argument.

jwtadvice 9y ago
First. Strawman. Not helpful. I actually lifted the nomenclature directly from National Security experts. I did not invent or distort any of the nomenclature. Further, it is a very accurate representation of the terminology and nomenclature. The point I hope to drive home is that 70 years later the same "chilling" (title word, not mine) is in effect. > "competitor countries" in the nuclear context mean "countries that threaten us with nuclear war" No. If you look at the list of target nations they include non-nuclear countries (Syria, Iran, etc). > "coercive tactic" and "when it serves the US national interest" correspondingly means "threatening nuclear war to dissuade existential threats" Mostly wrong. An existential threat could be an economic or political existential threat, or it could be conventional. And it can also be used (IS used) for non-existential coercion: say defending an ally. > "competitive disadvantage" means "being on the losing side of a nuclear exchange". No. It means facing a large risk of losing in a conflict of some kind for which there is a large interest in the US of winning. This does not apply only to nuclear exchange and indeed National Security practitioners are quite keen to discuss "cross-domain" warfare (lawfare, sanctions, political entanglement, etc). > We can debate what the official policy should or should not say but please don't take the terms out of context to make them sound scary You've taken the terms out of context. I hope I didn't make them sound scary. I mean, reality is a bit scary some times but I wrote that as quite matter-of-fact.
- gozur88 9y ago
  >If you look at the list of target nations they include non-nuclear countries (Syria, Iran, etc). US policy is to respond to non-nuclear WMD attacks with nuclear weapons, and it's a good policy. Because otherwise we would need to develop and maintain large stocks of chemical and biological weapons if the policy was to respond to WMD with the same kind of WMD.

DigDugDoug 9y ago

But what's the problem with this doctrine from the perspective of a nation-state actor? I'm being purposely obtuse with the question but I think to some extent the doctrine does make sense. It's too late to convince the world that having nuclear weapons isn't diplomatically advantageous, that cat has been out of the box for awhile. Any risks associated with having nuclear weapons tend to occur prior to their successful development which creates the risk/reward dynamic. In realist terms, other nations aren't really an American problem until they detract from American interests both material and diplomatic. I'm focusing on the US because that's where your criticism was centered but I'm of the opinion that this philosophy could be applied to any given nation albeit with altered strategic considerations.

jwtadvice 9y ago
It's interesting. I did not mean this comment as criticism (as you suggest). I'm merely accounting that the point of the article ("in the 1950s, the US policies on use of nuclear forces was startling - to our sensibilities - in how it exercised them for power in pragmatic, utilitarian ways") equally applies today.

jwhitlark 9y ago

The most recent nuclear policy I can find for the US rules this out. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Posture_Review https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Posture_Review