3 ms·

>there's no back door that only lets good guys go through it. Much as I agree with the general principle, this argument is flawed (except insofar as 'good guys

• beojan 9y ago
  Every single implementation of cryptography would be required to encrypt the message both with the original key and separately with the government master key, and store / transmit both. The master key suddenly becomes very valuable, and the incentive to crack it is enormous. In addition, there would be an enormous amount of ciphertext available that's encrypted with that key, and it would likely be shared widely across government. Also, wouldn't this require severely limiting the number of permitted encryption algorithms?
  • dTal 9y ago
    A clever system would easily mitigate your first point, probably with some sort of rolling key + key hierarchy (much like SSL and certificate authorities). As to your second point, yes. It would require severely limiting a great deal of things. Consider that "impossible" at your peril.
• zxcmx 9y ago
  I think what gets missed is that communcations interceptors are an entire platform (not just a key somewhere). There are lots of computers glommed onto the network to make the capability happen and humans to manage them. The hard part is managing keys, access, storage, networking etc. The security on a lot of "lawful access" systems for cell networks is not as great as one would hope, and the LI system is sometimes the goal of attackers in a telco. Just the capability (click n clone or tap to disk) is dangerous even when turned off. Of course, no one actually makes a telephony system without LI...
  • deleted 9y ago
    [deleted]