4 ms·
Have we had some big crypto failures besides "everyone was using md5" and "everyone was using DES"?
by baby 9y ago
Have we had some big crypto failures besides "everyone was using md5" and "everyone was using DES"?
- tptacek 9y agoYes: for instance, the TLS BEAST vulnerability, which affected all the block ciphers in that version of TLS, because the protocol standardized interchangeable ciphers and a message encryption construction based on CBC as separate components. Ironically, when the RC4 attack refinements were published, for awhile sites were forced to choose between a vulnerable CBC implementation and using the vulnerable RC4 cipher. With the exception of MD5 in X.509 certificates and RC4 in TLS, has there been another cryptographic vulnerability that required the retirement of a cipher? SWEET32 is about as close as you come to that, right? And, obviously, there have been many more problems, even just in TLS, than X.509 MD5 and RC4.
- baby 9y agoWasn't that more because we had not really thought of aead constructions? I mean we didn't even know we had to mac after encrypting. If we had more stream ciphers at the time we would not have been stuck with beast or rc4. Imo sweet32 was just the weak but well-marketed cherry on the top to get rid of the previous generation. We just had the sha-1 collision.
- tptacek 9y agoWe had plenty of good ciphers available in TLS when this happened, but because the BEAST bug was in joinery and not in the cipher itself, it didn't help. Cipher agility didn't help, and in fact probably hurt us.
- niftich 9y agoWhich "good" ciphersuites [1] were usable in TLS 1.0 when BEAST was made public in June 2011; with BEAST affecting only TLS 1.0? TLS 1.0 per RFC 2246 defined DES40_CBC, DES_CBC, 3DES_EDE_CBC, RC4_40, RC4_128, and IDEA_CBC. RFC 4132 added CAMELLIA_128_CBC and CAMELLIA_256_CBC in 2005, RFC 4162 proposed SEED_CBC in 2005, and RFC 6209 in April 2011 informationally specified ARIA_128_CBC, ARIA_256_CBC, ARIA_128_GCM, and ARIA_256_GCM, but the GCM ones only work in TLS 1.2 or later. Same story with CAMELLIA_*_GCM. Informational RFC 5469 in 2009 deprecated the use of DES and IDEA ciphersuites, so that left RC4, 3DES_EDE, the Korean ciphers SEED and ARIA, and CAMELLIA, with the block ciphers in CBC. Pretty much no one supported the latter three, and when Mozilla rejiggled the ciphersuites in 2013, support for these was removed entirely [2]. Your point still stands about BEAST being a flaw in the glue rather than the ciphers themselves, but I believe the parent poster makes a stronger point about the complete lack of AEAD constructions before TLS 1.2, and the lack of other stream ciphers which were more self-contained in TLS 1.0 and thus unaffected. [1] https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4 https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-paramete... [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12393683 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12393683
- dfox 9y agoI feel that tptacek's point is that excessive cipher agility in TLS precluded adoption of AEAD (and "unconventional" modes in general), because it was built on assumption that the interchangeable primitive is the block cipher itself (ie. keyed primitive that transforms n bit input to n bit output) and not the combination of cipher+mode (which transform arbitrary length input into some, preferrably longer, output). You cannot plug AEAD into framework that expects block cipher and MAC. (Due to how all this is really implemented, this in fact was not technical problem, but problem of "design culture" or something like that)
- richdougherty 9y agoI don't mean that something like TLS should support every type of crypto under the sun. As you say, that means TLS is only as secure as it's weakest component. What I mean is that if I make a new protocol, it could use a different type of crypto from what is in mainstream use, so at least this new protocol will fail independently from other protocols.