3 ms·
True. Both haves of what I asked for are stronger than what Godel demonstrated. But for this argument to be applicable to the Theory of Mind, it seems to me th
by mcguire 9y ago
True. Both haves of what I asked for are stronger than what Godel demonstrated.
But for this argument to be applicable to the Theory of Mind, it seems to me that it is exactly what Lucas and Penrose are claiming to exist.
If the only un-provable sentences are Godelian constructions, the whole issue isn't philosophically interesting. But that's not true, to my understanding.
So, there are statements that cannot be proven in, say, ZFC. Some of these statements are, I assume, "interesting"; they aren't simply constructs that are designed to be unprovable. Finally, for Lucas and Penrose's arguments to be meaningful, some of those statements should be obviously true or false---that is the only way for the human mind to not be limited in the way ZFC is limited.
If the truth of the statement is not obvious, then I'm not clear on how the human mind is stronger than the formal system in question. If the truth is obvious, but the statements are all variations on "I am lying" designed specifically for a given formal system, then I don't see how this is an actual interesting property of minds.