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Refuting Lucas is very simple: Godel sentences can only be constructed for circumscribed systems, i.e. a system where you have written down all of the axioms an
by lisper 9y ago
Refuting Lucas is very simple: Godel sentences can only be constructed for circumscribed systems, i.e. a system where you have written down all of the axioms and inference rules. So the only way to circumscribe a human brain is to isolate it from its environment. As soon as you let it communicate with (say) another human brain, you can no longer Godelize it because that brain is not the system any more, it's the two communicating brains working together. That system might have a Godel sentence of its own, but it's not the same as the Godel sentence of individual brains.
So if I can put you in an isolation tank and model your brain, then I can in fact (at least in principle) construct your Godel sentence and know for certain that you will never come to the realization that this outrageously complicated mess I've just constructed (the one that says of itself that you will never come to see its truth) is true, and I can feel smug about the fact that I can see that this is true and you never will. But here's the kicker: I can never gloat about my superiority to you, because as soon as I do you are no longer in isolation. You are communicating with me, and the sentence I've take great pains to construct is no longer your Godel sentence. It is the Godel sentence of you in isolation, but as soon as I tell you your Godel sentence -- indeed as soon as I (or anyone else) say anything to you, my construction falls apart and I have to start over.
Ironically, far from proving that we are not machines, Lucas's argument actually goes a long way towards demonstrating that we are, because coming up with examples of things that we interacting brains know to be true that a particular isolated brain will (with extremely high probability) never come to realize is not difficult. The four-color theorem, for example, is probably beyond any single isolated human brain. Indeed, the very argument you are reading now is probably beyond any single human brain because the brain that's writing it would never have come up with it had Godel and Lucas (and Turing) not paved the way.
- fiatjaf 9y agoThat was a good argument. Have you formulated it by yourself?
- lisper 9y agoIf I said "yes" I would be refuting my own argument :-) I composed the words in the above comment, but I don't actually know if the substance of that argument is original with me. It is heavily based on things I've learned in other places, but I don't have any specific recollection of having seen the argument being framed in exactly that way before. It's possible I invented it, but I doubt it. It's not a particularly deep insight, a minor variation on a deeper theme, that "meta-Godelization" is not algorithmic, a fact that I first learned by reading Hofstadter's "Godel, Escher, Bach." I don't actually know what the original source of that result is (I should probably go find out). But I'll happily take credit for the pedagogy if it somehow turns out I got there first.
- ifdefdebug 9y agoDoes your argument hold if you consider that input to the brain is limited to the reception of electromagnetic/mechanical waves through a set of sensors, being the fact that one can transmit speech (and Godel sentences) through those sensors is just a higher level abstraction? Put in another way: Couldn't I in principle define such a circumscribed system with all axioms and inference rules by including all of those sensors and all of their possible states into the system?
- lisper 9y agoYes, of course you can. But if you are part of that system, then you can't Godelize it. In order to Godelize a system, not only does the system need to be circumscribed, but the thing doing the Godelizing has to be outside of the boundaries of the circumscription. Let's recall the original argument: "a mechanist formulates a particular mechanistic thesis by claiming, for example, that the human mind is a Turing machine with a given formal specification S. Lucas then refutes this thesis by producing S’s Gödel sentence, which we can see is true, but the Turing machine cannot. Then, a mechanist puts forth a different thesis by claiming, for example, that the human mind is a Turing machine with formal specification S’. But then Lucas produces the Gödel sentence for S’, and so on, until, presumably, the mechanist simply gives up." When you are presented with S there are two possibilities: either S includes you, or it doesn't. If S includes you, then you can't Godelize it. If S doesn't include you, then you might be able to Godelize it, but if you present your result to the thing that S is supposed to be a model of -- indeed as soon as you interact with that thing in any way -- then S is no longer an accurate model of that system because now it is interacting with something that, by assumption, was not part of the model.
- fiatjaf 9y agoOk, I think I have a rebuttal: your whole point rests on the assumption that a human mind is indeed a machine, which is begging the question. Is that right?
- lisper 9y agoNo. I'm neither assuming nor showing that the human mind is a machine. All I'm showing is that the Lucas-Penrose argument that the mind is not a machine is invalid, because it glibly assumes that the human mind is capable of Godelizing any possible mechanistic model of the mind, and that is not necessarily true. If the mind is a machine, then it will not be able to Godelize a mechanistic model that includes that mind as a component. The best any given mind can do is construct the Godel sentence for a mechanistic model of some other mind. But that does not show that the first mind is not a machine.
- fiatjaf 9y agoI get it.