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1. If Lucas and Penrose are right, there are statements which are unequivocally true, but which cannot be proved in any known formal system. It should be possib
by mcguire 9y ago
1. If Lucas and Penrose are right, there are statements which are unequivocally true, but which cannot be proved in any known formal system. It should be possible to exhibit a few. (Extra credit if they avoid theology.)
If the only such statements are artificial Gödelian sentences, I'm afraid I'm...uninterested, in the same way Lucas is uninterested in inconsistent humans.
2. Lucas and Penrose assert that some entities are significantly more powerful than others. To my knowledge, Lucas describes no mechanism for this. (To his credit, Penrose does, but, to my knowledge, the Bell inequality among other things means quantum mechanics is fundamentally random. That's not helpful.)
What could be the nature of such a mechanism? If it's material, it should be possible to include it in future machines. If it's not, we are in the realm of theology again.
3. So humans are intelligent and intelligent-seeming machines only simulate intelligence. If the difference is not common, obvious, and readily meaningful, then where is the distinction? ("So what? I can't write an opera either.")
- manyoso 9y agoSigh, they don't claim that. You are also arguing with straw men. I wish people would read what Penrose actually argues instead of just assuming he is an idiot (one of the most brilliant minds of this or any century) because he argues against Strong AI. There are good refutations of Penrose' argument, but I've seen none of them here. Just a bunch of bandwagon hackers assuming Penrose doesn't know what he is talking about and then putting up lazy straw man takedowns.
- mcguire 9y agoDon't claim what? That there are statements that are known to be true but which cannot be proved, or that the human mind is strictly stronger than a machine? Edit: Or perhaps that Penrose is not claiming that QM is some kind of super secret sauce that makes multicellular life intrinsically stronger than computing machines?
- manyoso 9y ago"...statements which are unequivocally true, but which cannot be proved in any known formal system." That.
- manyoso 9y agoTo be clear, I'm speaking of Penrose specifically. Penrose goes no further than Godel. He doesn't add anything to Godel's argument about formal systems and statements. All Penrose is saying is that Turing machines can not be the basis for modeling the human mind. He is not saying that the human mind is not governed by physics. He is not saying that the universe is not governed by physics. And he is not resorting to 'quantum woo' like some here are saying. Penrose' argument is that there is something non-algorithmic going on in the human brain and that this non-algorithmic process is governed by physical laws. He then goes on to discuss objective collapse theories for quantum mechanics and how that may be the source of non-algorithmic behavior in the human brain. To be clear, objective collapse theories have as of yet no experimental evidence. But, crucially, they are not inconsistent with QM as some above have said. Also, the precise biological mechanism that Penrose postulates for how the brain operates with objective collapse is highly controversial ie, microtubules.
- mcguire 9y agoModels of computation have some interesting properties. One is that all of the "reasonable" ones are less powerful than Turing machines (FSMs, stack machines, etc.) or equivalent to Turing machines (recursive functions, combinators, TMs with multiple tapes, etc.). It's effectively a closed category. There are models that are more powerful than TMs, but the ones I know about have "unreasonable" powers. The one that comes to mind came from A.K. Dewdney (I think); it does an unbounded amount of work in a single time step by having an unbounded number of computational units. And that is just not kosher. So there is a certain amount of circumstantial evidence for the definition of "computable" being something like a Turing machine. And this definition of computable has limits, as in Godel (never thought I'd miss my phone's keyboard) and Turing. As you describe, Lucas, Penrose, and others such as Searle want to walk a very fine line. They want to claim that the human mind is not limited in the way that computable functions are limited, which I understand; it certainly doesn't feel like I am so limited. On the other hand, they want to avoid going off the edge into full-blown mysticism: dualism and ye immortal soul. Unfortunately for those like me (and I know I am) who take materialism somewhat seriously, their arguments feel more like the post-Darwin arguments that, yes, animals and stuff do evolve like that, but people are different. The closed set of computational models of TM-equivalence do seem to capture "computable functions", and those computable functions do seem to cover what is possible from any system built on biology, chemistry, and ultimately physics. Their arguments seem to be either making a distinction that doesn't make a difference, or sneaking in supernatural powers. (You can see the truth or falsehood of a statement without a proof? Reliably?) So arguments for a non-algorithmic middle ground between TM-equivalence and "quantum woo" (great phrase, btw) are giving me problems. If I am a mixed bag of incomplete and inconsistent, with limited rationality that is not well described as a formal system but is weaker than a Turing machine, as I suspect I am, then the appearance of a non-algorithmic process is simply a misunderstanding. On the other hand, if the non-algorithmic goings-on are correct, "quantum woo" feels like the most reasonable description of their powers. I'd really like some strong, unarguable evidence before I accept that step.
- dang 9y agoWould you please not argue like this here? We all understand how annoying ignorant internet dismissals can be, but if you respond merely by excreting bile into the system, you're making it even worse than they are. Among your other comments there are some that are quite substantive (yay) and others like this one (boo). Kindly stick with the substance even if other people aren't. That enhances credibility and helps tend the garden for everyone.
- manyoso 9y agoYes, I will try to take the bile out.
- lisper 9y ago> there are statements which are unequivocally true, but which cannot be proved in any known formal system No. You are misunderstanding Godel's theorem. For any given formal system there exists a Godel sentence which the system cannot prove. But the Godel sentence for every system is different. Moreover, there is no algorithm for constructing a Godel sentence. If there were, then a TM could follow that algorithm to construct its own Godel sentence. So every formal system has a (different) Godel sentence, but there does not exist a universal Godel sentence that is unprovable by all formal systems.
- enugu 9y agoConstructing the sentence is algorithmic. The key part is asserting that the sentence is true. For instance ZFC will prove that A:(ZFC cant prove GodelStatement(ZFC) OR ZFC is inconsistent).GodelStatement is an algorithmic function which takes a list of axioms in some formal framework. Now, lets make ZFC' which is ZFC + 'ZFC is consistent'. ZFC' can prove A(as it contains ZFC) and uses the consistency of ZFC to prove A':(ZFC cant prove Godel(ZFC)) . Similarly, a program decides a set of problems(like does this Turing machine halt or does this diophantine equation have solutions) with access to its source code will be able to algorithmically generate the problem instance on which it will not halt. You can modify the program to create a new program which will use this information, but it will be a new program.
- lisper 9y ago> Constructing the sentence is algorithmic. No, it isn't. But it's a non-trivial point. > Similarly, a program decides a set of problems(like does this Turing machine halt or does this diophantine equation have solutions) with access to its source code will be able to algorithmically generate the problem instance on which it will not halt. You can modify the program to create a new program which will use this information, but it will be a new program. So this all depends on what you consider a "new program". Suppose we write a program that actually does this: analyzes its own code, algorithmically produces the Godel sentence for that code, then modifies its code to include that as an axiom, forever. That program is a program, and that program will also have a Godel sentence, but one which it cannot construct using that algorithm. You need a different algorithm to construct Godel sentences for programs that constructs Godel sentences on programs that don't construct Godel sentences. The result is a hierarchy of Godel-sentence constructors. At any level in the hierarchy the procedure is algorithmic, but going from one level to the next is not. It's similar to the process of constructing the hierarchy of ordinals, which is also provably non-algorithmic.