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What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? Are

What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? Are we so bound?

naasking 9y ago
> What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? There could be many that could answer some such questions, paraconsistent and inconsistent for example.
Udo 9y ago
That's a loaded argument. Human biology, and by extension human minds, follow a myriad of rules that are a result of biological processes being played out. Likewise "machines" also follow the rules laid out by their physical design. There is no fundamental difference in this regard, there is no new set of information-theoretical rules that comes into play when you switch to a carbon-based machinery. > What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? In the context of this argument, the mind of the human mathematician would be subject to the rules of the formal system. Since Gödel we know that such a formal system cannot be proven true inside the system itself. However, an entity that views the system from the outside can potentially see it's true. There is no fundamental difference between a human mind and a hypothetical machine mind as far as the capability to come to the same conclusion is concerned. That's why Lucas took special care to specify upfront that the machine mind is prohibited from coming to that conclusion, by confining it to live within the formal system only. Yes, their argument is really that circular. > Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? Are we so bound? We are not, and neither would a generally intelligent machine. The burden of proof is on Lucas/Penrose to show that a generally intelligent machine would still be bound to that formalism, at which point it would cease to be considered generally intelligent. They seem to argue that their postulate is true because the individual components of such a machine are bound by those rules, but then again so are the individual components of our brains.
- scandox 9y ago
  Well I wasn't intending it as an argument. I was actually just interested to see what someone who had actually thought about it would say.
- manyoso 9y ago
  So your claim is that the Human mind is a physical machine and that computers are also physical machines and thus both are bound to physical laws... and this negates Penrose how? Do you think Penrose disagrees that the Human mind is bound by physical laws??
  - Analemma_ 9y ago
    I think Penrose is handwaving to try and have it both ways: he's saying the brain obeys physical laws, but that it does not embed a formal computational model. But that's impossible: the second is a logical consequence of the first.
    - manyoso 9y ago
      "But that's impossible: the second is a logical consequence of the first." No, it is not. It is far from proven that universal physical law can everywhere be simulated by a Turing machine. If you had proof of that you'd be up for a Nobel. So publish your paper or perhaps consider that Roger Penrose is not an idiot and you might not know what you are talking about.
      - deleted 9y ago
        [deleted]
      - gpderetta 9y ago
        It is not proven and possibly it can never be proven. But it can be disproven, and given the success of the Church-Turing thesis, I would say that the burden of proof rest on those that claim that a system more powerful than a Turing machine exist.
burkaman 9y ago
> Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? No, that's just a current limitation of the kind of machines we know how to make.
mcguire 9y ago
> What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? Neurobiology. Chemistry. Physics. Of course, any machine will also be subject to the same formalism, so.... To start with, no physical entity has an unbounded memory available.
danielam 9y ago
Indeed. To make such a claim demonstrates a misunderstanding of what formalism is. When human beings develop formalisms, they do so on the basis of semantics. If I wish to formalize something, I must first have a relevant understanding of the nature of the thing, or things involved and the relations between them. The development of formalism is a translation of semantics into syntactic rules devoid of meaning. Doing so allows us to mechanize reasoning. Algebra is an example of an early move in this direction. Something we learn in mathematics is that two theories concerning different objects can be formally equivalent. Computers are strictly devoid of semantics. They are, at best, purely syntactic machines. There is no amount of syntax than can ever lead to semantics. Strictly speaking, computers don't even compute. Further reading: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/10/do-machines-compute-functions.html http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/10/do-machines-compute-...
- jamesrcole 9y ago
  For a bit of context on Feser and his views, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Feser https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Feser
- simonh 9y ago
  > Something we learn in mathematics is that two theories concerning different objects can be formally equivalent. Can be, but do not have to be. A distinction through which a host of mistakes have fallen, including Donald Hoffman's 'disproof' of functionalism.

What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? Are we so bound?

naasking 9y ago

> What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? There could be many that could answer some such questions, paraconsistent and inconsistent for example.

Udo 9y ago

That's a loaded argument. Human biology, and by extension human minds, follow a myriad of rules that are a result of biological processes being played out. Likewise "machines" also follow the rules laid out by their physical design. There is no fundamental difference in this regard, there is no new set of information-theoretical rules that comes into play when you switch to a carbon-based machinery. > What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? In the context of this argument, the mind of the human mathematician would be subject to the rules of the formal system. Since Gödel we know that such a formal system cannot be proven true inside the system itself. However, an entity that views the system from the outside can potentially see it's true. There is no fundamental difference between a human mind and a hypothetical machine mind as far as the capability to come to the same conclusion is concerned. That's why Lucas took special care to specify upfront that the machine mind is prohibited from coming to that conclusion, by confining it to live within the formal system only. Yes, their argument is really that circular. > Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? Are we so bound? We are not, and neither would a generally intelligent machine. The burden of proof is on Lucas/Penrose to show that a generally intelligent machine would still be bound to that formalism, at which point it would cease to be considered generally intelligent. They seem to argue that their postulate is true because the individual components of such a machine are bound by those rules, but then again so are the individual components of our brains.

scandox 9y ago
Well I wasn't intending it as an argument. I was actually just interested to see what someone who had actually thought about it would say.
manyoso 9y ago
So your claim is that the Human mind is a physical machine and that computers are also physical machines and thus both are bound to physical laws... and this negates Penrose how? Do you think Penrose disagrees that the Human mind is bound by physical laws??
- Analemma_ 9y ago
  I think Penrose is handwaving to try and have it both ways: he's saying the brain obeys physical laws, but that it does not embed a formal computational model. But that's impossible: the second is a logical consequence of the first.
  - manyoso 9y ago
    "But that's impossible: the second is a logical consequence of the first." No, it is not. It is far from proven that universal physical law can everywhere be simulated by a Turing machine. If you had proof of that you'd be up for a Nobel. So publish your paper or perhaps consider that Roger Penrose is not an idiot and you might not know what you are talking about.
    - deleted 9y ago
      [deleted]
    - gpderetta 9y ago
      It is not proven and possibly it can never be proven. But it can be disproven, and given the success of the Church-Turing thesis, I would say that the burden of proof rest on those that claim that a system more powerful than a Turing machine exist.

burkaman 9y ago

> Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? No, that's just a current limitation of the kind of machines we know how to make.

mcguire 9y ago

> What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? Neurobiology. Chemistry. Physics. Of course, any machine will also be subject to the same formalism, so.... To start with, no physical entity has an unbounded memory available.

danielam 9y ago

Indeed. To make such a claim demonstrates a misunderstanding of what formalism is. When human beings develop formalisms, they do so on the basis of semantics. If I wish to formalize something, I must first have a relevant understanding of the nature of the thing, or things involved and the relations between them. The development of formalism is a translation of semantics into syntactic rules devoid of meaning. Doing so allows us to mechanize reasoning. Algebra is an example of an early move in this direction. Something we learn in mathematics is that two theories concerning different objects can be formally equivalent. Computers are strictly devoid of semantics. They are, at best, purely syntactic machines. There is no amount of syntax than can ever lead to semantics. Strictly speaking, computers don't even compute. Further reading: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/10/do-machines-compute-functions.html http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/10/do-machines-compute-...

jamesrcole 9y ago
For a bit of context on Feser and his views, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Feser https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Feser
simonh 9y ago
> Something we learn in mathematics is that two theories concerning different objects can be formally equivalent. Can be, but do not have to be. A distinction through which a host of mistakes have fallen, including Donald Hoffman's 'disproof' of functionalism.