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Yeah, the title seems slanted. It's an interesting question though, that of negligence. If you handle a deadly chemical and manage to kill 15000 people, it's pr
by lutorm 16y ago
Yeah, the title seems slanted. It's an interesting question though, that of negligence. If you handle a deadly chemical and manage to kill 15000 people, it's pretty clear that someone didn't consider the possible consequences (or didn't care enough). I'm usually not much for scapegoating, but I think this is one of the cases where it is incumbent upon you to make sure you don't kill people. (And sabotage or not, it's still your responsibility to safeguard the facilities if the potential consequences of a leak are that dire.)
- hugh3 16y agoYes, my complaint about the title shouldn't be taken as a complete endorsement of Union Carbide's view of events. If you choose to put a tank of poison gas within death range of fifteen thousand people, especially of the "if any water ever gets in this tank will explode" variety, you have to bear at least partial responsibility for whatever happens.
- hga 16y agoRead the center of this item which is cited by stretchwithme elsewhere but not hotlinked: http://www.objectivistcenter.org/ct-2089-mutual_plunder.aspx http://www.objectivistcenter.org/ct-2089-mutual_plunder.aspx It agrees with my recollection of the reporting at the time, that when Union Carbide built the plant in 1969 it was in a deserted area and that the victims moved there later (according to this account, due to the actions of local planners).
- hugh3 16y agoAh yes, well if that's the case then we should definitely heap some blame on the local planners who allowed residential zones so close to the big scary gas canister of death.
- sliverstorm 16y ago> ... sabotage or not, it's still your responsibility to safeguard the facilities... Half of sabotage is breaking safeguards. Not that precautions and defenses shouldn't exist, but asking for safeguards that are still safe after being sabotaged is like asking cryptologists to design a system that is still secure after it's been compromised.