5 ms·
I agree with the conclusion. Posterous could fix this problem by implementing something like The Zucchini Method (http://www.jgc.org/antispam/03152005-21501206
by jgrahamc 16y ago
I agree with the conclusion. Posterous could fix this problem by implementing something like The Zucchini Method (http://www.jgc.org/antispam/03152005-2150120647b00f4af9d3443f97783bf2.pdf http://www.jgc.org/antispam/03152005-2150120647b00f4af9d3443... [PDF]). Basically, they could accept posts via email as long as the user included some hard to guess word (or other token) in the subject line.
- there 16y agoor do what flickr does and give you a unique email address to send to that only you will know. you can add it to your address book so you won't have to remember it, and it's probably stronger than what most users would choose for a password.
- russell_h 16y agoSuch considerations might be overkill for flickr/posterous but that does leave your "secret" email address in the logs of every smtp relay along the way. Its sort of equivalent to putting a password in a URL.
- mbenjaminsmith 16y agoYeah, we're not talking about credit card info. Why not have post@ plus a secret@ available in your options. The more technically inclined could easily use the second, most likely safe enough, system. I really hope they don't complicate an otherwise zen-like experience.
- piotrSikora 16y agoSecurity shouldn't be optional. And this wouldn't fix the issue at all... I bet that 80%+ of users would leave the default post@ submission address.
- neilc 16y agoSecurity shouldn't be optional. That seems like a very dogmatic attitude. Security almost always comes at some cost (e.g., inconvenience), and sometimes that cost is not worth the benefit.
- piotrSikora 16y agoYes, I agree with you. It pretty much always comes at some cost and "user-friendliness" hurts most of the times. But it is exactly that "easy-to-use" design that leads to security holes like the one presented here. And I stand by what I wrote earlier, if you want to add some security options then they should be enabled by default. Having even the best security system in-place is useless when it's disabled. Isn't it?
- jtheory 16y agoThe cost -- if someone successfully manages to spoof their way into your posterous blog -- isn't very high. You'll probably notice fairly quickly, it's hard for "the bad guy" to use for actual gain, and there's no money involved either way. I use a service called Postful to send snail mail via email, that has security along these lines -- I email them a PDF with a mailing address in the subject line, and they post a letter and charge me a buck. They give security options (in my case, I include a "secret" word in the subject line, and there's a confirmation link that's emailed to me), but if I wanted, I could even let anyway send email to a given postful.com address, and it would mail a letter on my dime with no confirmation. I haven't heard about any abuses.
- there 16y agoif you're relaying mail through smtp servers you don't trust, i think you have bigger problems to worry about than someone posting a funny message to your weblog.
- InclinedPlane 16y ago"smtp relay along the way"? This isn't UUCP, the message will go from A to B across the internet backbone. There will only be SMTP relays along the way if either your email host or the receiver's email host has chosen to set things up that way. We'd have a much bigger problem with internet security if everyone's email was relayed through questionable servers as a matter of course.
- jrockway 16y agoMost residential DSL and cable users are prohibited from connecting to port 25, except on a special "smarthost". This machine, and anyone reading its logs, will learn your blog password. More secure than no password, but not secure.
- InclinedPlane 16y ago[citation needed] More to the point, what you are saying is that your ISP can read your unencrypted internet traffic. This is not news.
- olefoo 16y agoFortunately most of the people who operate mail relays for ISPs are honest and responsible.
- deleted 16y ago[deleted]
- tomcarlson 16y agoExactly. This is what we do on CallTheWeb. Not only is it much safer, but it allows our users to contribute messages to multiple accounts (say, their personal account, as well as a company account). If you tie things to a single email address, you limit your power users.
- lhorie 16y agoPerhaps a compromise would be to give the user the option to send emails to a hard-to-guess email address and then, if the user comes across the situation where he needs to delete a spoofed post, make a note near the deletion link that the option is available This way, grandpa talking about his dog doesn't need to bother learning about security he doesn't really care about and the power user can post securely if it so happens that someone decides to spam his blog
- Vivtek 16y agoI think the key here is that grandpa talking about his dog will find in short order that his Posterous blog is full of Viagra ads. Just because the SEO spammers haven't started using Posterous yet doesn't mean they won't pile on in droves once they realize it's possible.
- d0nk 16y agoOther people replied about a randomized/hard to guess email address. Building on your idea of a "hard to guess word" or token in the subject, posterous could allow a user to upload their public key, and require that their posts be gpg/pgp signed with their key (obviously this would be something that users would have to opt into). The displayed post could simply strip out the signature as it would only be needed for authentication.
- Tichy 16y agoOnly with that kind of thing, or even the Zucchini method mentioned above, they would kind of lose their tag line about the easiest way to update a blog (or whatever it is).
- jey 16y agoThey should just use SPF. This is what SPF is designed for, and it allows them to keep the user experience simple and straightforward. No weird passphrase to enter into the email, no weird random email address to email to, etc.
- ComputerGuru 16y agoSPF only identifies the sending domain, not the sender himself. If your address is gmail and my address is gmail, our mx domain has the same spf record and same IPs. Sure, some mail servers will prevent you from authenticating with one ID and sending as another, but many others will let that slide.
- jey 16y agoYes, but that's a fault of the mailserver on that domain. It shouldn't allow spoofed email to be sent from its own domain.
- benatkin 16y agoSounds like a good partial solution to me. If SPF traces it back to a mail server that doesn't allow spoofed email, it could skip the confirmation step. GMail lets people change the from field, but only to an email address they can show they have access to, by clicking a confirmation link.
- ergo98 16y agoWhich others? Give some examples. Gmail won't. Hotmail won't. Yahoo won't. In fact I can't think of a single authenticating mail service that doesn't also validate authorization (e.g. you can only send as you). Now maybe you're going to point out micro-mail servers, but that's kind of beside the point because very few other people share it with you. e.g. you used gmail as your example, but services like gmail aren't vulnerable to that.
- petercooper 16y agoYeah, no passphrase, just a hard to explain set of weird looking DNS entries to confuse the heck out of non-technical people with. The point of having no passworwd is to make it simpler. You might as well go back to using a password instead of using SPF.
- webwright 16y agoThe subject line is the title of the the post at Posterous... though I suppose the could strip it out... i.e. "subj: Blog Post Title Goes here #sekretpassword". Certainly not ideal. Typos would confuse matters and the idea of secret word authentication is not exactly common/obvious for the masses.
- SkyMarshal 16y agoThat would also require sending #sekretpasword in plaintext, also not ideal.
- deleted 16y ago[deleted]