I don't understand why sandboxing the userland is not a thing on the linux desktop at least. When you sanely configure a un*x server you generally at least crea

I don't understand why sandboxing the userland is not a thing on the linux desktop at least. When you sanely configure a un*x server you generally at least create a user per application. The web server runs as www, the database with its own user, the ssh process runs as the logged-in user (the daemon runs as root obviously, but only for just as long as it needs before forking a less priviledged child) etc... But when it comes to the desktop everything runs at $user and that's the end of it. While this makes sense for multi user "mainframe"-style systems, for modern desktops it's an anti-pattern almost. I wish I could run my browser as its own user, my password manager as an other, my code editor/toolchain in an other, the closed source spotify client in a third etc... It's kind of doable today but it's not exactly friendly to setup. In particular Xorg is not exactly designed with client isolation in mind as far as I can tell, preventing one window from overtaking an other without being too cumbersome is left as as exercise to the reader. But really, at the OS level I feel like we already have all the functionality we need and we just completely ignore it. On a desktop the critical account isn't really root per se, rather it's the user account that contains all of my data. Maybe we've just been doing it wrong the entire time and we should just log into our single-user desktop computers as root and then spawn our shells and other applications as various unpriviledged users as necessary (this could easily be scripted in launcher scripts). I wonder if anybody has attempted to do that, but again I don't expect that Xorg would work very well in this configuration.