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> Kelly argues that this ownership of the lobstering commons, in a cooperative-like structure, leads to greater sustainability. >> Large corporate boats can op

by pash 9y ago

> Kelly argues that this ownership of the lobstering commons, in a cooperative-like structure, leads to greater sustainability. >> Large corporate boats can operate only in designated areas. Instead of permitting limitless liberty to absentee owners for the seeking of wealth -- by hired hands indifferent to local custom -- Maine set spinning a new governing pattern…. That the right to make a living comes before the right to make a killing. That fairness for the many is more important than maximizing for the few. That sustaining the prosperity of larger living systems, both human and wild, is the root condition for the flourishing of all. At least insofar as Kelly's argument pertains to the management of fisheries and other commons, it is—economically speaking—more wrong than right. A tragedy of the commons can be avoided in several ways, and none of them has much to do with putting "fairness for the many" ahead of "maximizing for the few". Indeed, a tragedy of the commons arises only when "the many" have unrestricted access to a scarce resource, and proceed to exploit it in an unsustainable way, due to the strategic nature of the situation. Kelly would have you think otherwise, but "large corporate boats" are not the root cause of overfishing; the root cause is the desire on the part of each fisherman in an unregulated commoms to haul in the biggest catch he can before someone beats him to it. So aside from imposing regulation, another way to prevent a tragedy of the commons is to get rid of the commons: grant exclusive use of the former commons to a single party, who then has an incentive for good stewardship. And quite contrary to Kelly's characterization of it, Maine's solution to managing its lobster rights can be seen as an instance of favoring the few over the many: lobstering was restricted to a relative few legally priveledged parties, few enough to make coordinating sustainable lobstering practices feasible. As is often the case when the law arbitrarily privileges some parties over others, there is an overlooked harm here, suffered by would-be lobstermen that the rules say cannot be. So it seems to me that Kelly's words express her worldview and her somewhat misplaced good intentions—it is the curse of the economically uninformed that their good intentions will often lead them to a destination they didn't seek—but nothing more.

zz01234 9y ago
> another way to prevent a tragedy of the commons is to get rid of the commons: grant exclusive use of the former commons to a single party, who then has an incentive for good stewardship. There is a single party, and it is The State of Maine. > And quite contrary to Kelly's characterization of it, Maine's solution to managing its lobster rights can be seen as an instance of favoring the few over the many I fail to see your reasoning here. A single corporate entity would would prefer to employ the smallest number of people possible.
- pash 9y ago
  > There is a single party, and it is The State of Maine. That's an interesting way of looking at it, but it doesn't strike me as one that contributes much to understanding the phenomenon. Individual licensed lobstermen, not the State of Maine, bear the costs and reap the rewards of their catch. The role of the State of Maine is to set rules about how and how much they catch (to their collective benefit), but the state is not in any meaningful sense catching lobsters. > I fail to see your reasoning here. A single corporate entity would would prefer to employ the smallest number of people possible. I'm not sure what reasoning you think you're failing to see. I did not say anything about how many people unitary ownership would employ, nor did I express any opinion about the merits and demerits of unitary ownership as a solution to the tragedy of the commons; I only noted that it is one, to illustrate my point that Kelly's characterization of the problem and its solution in terms of "fairness for the many" versus "maximizing for the few" exhibits no understanding of either the problem or the solution and seems to express nothing beyond her sympathies.
- briandear 9y ago
  Is the goal to employ the largest number of people possible -- or provide a good to the public at the lowest cost and highest quality. You lower the price of lobster because of efficiency and better sustainability, you increase the margins for restraurants that sell it and thus that industry can grow and expand, providing both increased tax revenues as well as economic expansion: more successful restaurants improves the entire economy as support industries also expand. The fundamental question of economics is really about the desire to protect th vocal view (lobstermen) vs. the overall economy at large. Regulation is necessary however such regulation should be tilted towards favoring substainability and efficiency over specific groups: i.e. lobstermen. A lobsterman is benefited less by overall efficiency than the overall economy. It's in his best interest to have a restricted supply and higher prices. If a lobsterman had his way, the lobster he catches in his single boat would be the only lobster available to the market. Lower prices and greater demand doesn't benefit him -- his boat holds a finite amount. A greater supply doesn't benefit him either -- after he fills his boat. His interest in sustainability only extends as far as his own boat -- beyond that, why would he care -- excess supply means lower prices so he would have to work harder to make the same profit. Corporate entities can simply buy more boats.
solidsnack9000 9y ago
You can of course enclose the commons and grant it to one party to manage but then you're not faced with the problem of how to manage a commons anymore!
- pash 9y ago
  Quite right!
cityhall 9y ago
If we make the same argument in favor of taxi cartels, people see the flaw right away. The system may encourage conservation but that's only one of many side effects and we're glossing over the costs.
- camelite 9y ago
  That's because they're different. "Over taxiing" won't deplete the population of taxi riders. Just because you know something about the economics of the taxi business doesn't mean you can indiscriminately apply the same logic to a different industry. Which in a thread full of condescending compassion for the economically illiterate, is by far the more common fallacy.
Thimothy 9y ago
>>So aside from imposing regulation, another way to prevent a tragedy of the commons is to get rid of the commons: grant exclusive use of the former commons to a single party, who then has an incentive for good stewardship. >>As is often the case when the law arbitrarily privileges some parties over others, there is an overlooked harm here, suffered by would-be lobstermen that the rules say cannot be. I fail to see how granting exclusive use to a single party would benefit "would-be lobstermen", if anything, its economies of scale would allow it to employ less people. Not to talk about how the hypothetical single party might find another, more profitable, equilibrium point with less, and more expensive, lobsters in the market, employing less people. Or sending all of them to china and damaging the coastal tourism of Maine. Also, I can't think of a modern instance of a monopoly that was given the control of a limited renovable resource and behaved nicely in an unregulated environment. All the instances I can think of were heavily regulated.

by pash 9y ago

zz01234 9y ago

> another way to prevent a tragedy of the commons is to get rid of the commons: grant exclusive use of the former commons to a single party, who then has an incentive for good stewardship. There is a single party, and it is The State of Maine. > And quite contrary to Kelly's characterization of it, Maine's solution to managing its lobster rights can be seen as an instance of favoring the few over the many I fail to see your reasoning here. A single corporate entity would would prefer to employ the smallest number of people possible.

pash 9y ago
> There is a single party, and it is The State of Maine. That's an interesting way of looking at it, but it doesn't strike me as one that contributes much to understanding the phenomenon. Individual licensed lobstermen, not the State of Maine, bear the costs and reap the rewards of their catch. The role of the State of Maine is to set rules about how and how much they catch (to their collective benefit), but the state is not in any meaningful sense catching lobsters. > I fail to see your reasoning here. A single corporate entity would would prefer to employ the smallest number of people possible. I'm not sure what reasoning you think you're failing to see. I did not say anything about how many people unitary ownership would employ, nor did I express any opinion about the merits and demerits of unitary ownership as a solution to the tragedy of the commons; I only noted that it is one, to illustrate my point that Kelly's characterization of the problem and its solution in terms of "fairness for the many" versus "maximizing for the few" exhibits no understanding of either the problem or the solution and seems to express nothing beyond her sympathies.
briandear 9y ago
Is the goal to employ the largest number of people possible -- or provide a good to the public at the lowest cost and highest quality. You lower the price of lobster because of efficiency and better sustainability, you increase the margins for restraurants that sell it and thus that industry can grow and expand, providing both increased tax revenues as well as economic expansion: more successful restaurants improves the entire economy as support industries also expand. The fundamental question of economics is really about the desire to protect th vocal view (lobstermen) vs. the overall economy at large. Regulation is necessary however such regulation should be tilted towards favoring substainability and efficiency over specific groups: i.e. lobstermen. A lobsterman is benefited less by overall efficiency than the overall economy. It's in his best interest to have a restricted supply and higher prices. If a lobsterman had his way, the lobster he catches in his single boat would be the only lobster available to the market. Lower prices and greater demand doesn't benefit him -- his boat holds a finite amount. A greater supply doesn't benefit him either -- after he fills his boat. His interest in sustainability only extends as far as his own boat -- beyond that, why would he care -- excess supply means lower prices so he would have to work harder to make the same profit. Corporate entities can simply buy more boats.

solidsnack9000 9y ago

You can of course enclose the commons and grant it to one party to manage but then you're not faced with the problem of how to manage a commons anymore!

pash 9y ago
Quite right!

cityhall 9y ago

If we make the same argument in favor of taxi cartels, people see the flaw right away. The system may encourage conservation but that's only one of many side effects and we're glossing over the costs.

camelite 9y ago
That's because they're different. "Over taxiing" won't deplete the population of taxi riders. Just because you know something about the economics of the taxi business doesn't mean you can indiscriminately apply the same logic to a different industry. Which in a thread full of condescending compassion for the economically illiterate, is by far the more common fallacy.

Thimothy 9y ago

>>So aside from imposing regulation, another way to prevent a tragedy of the commons is to get rid of the commons: grant exclusive use of the former commons to a single party, who then has an incentive for good stewardship. >>As is often the case when the law arbitrarily privileges some parties over others, there is an overlooked harm here, suffered by would-be lobstermen that the rules say cannot be. I fail to see how granting exclusive use to a single party would benefit "would-be lobstermen", if anything, its economies of scale would allow it to employ less people. Not to talk about how the hypothetical single party might find another, more profitable, equilibrium point with less, and more expensive, lobsters in the market, employing less people. Or sending all of them to china and damaging the coastal tourism of Maine. Also, I can't think of a modern instance of a monopoly that was given the control of a limited renovable resource and behaved nicely in an unregulated environment. All the instances I can think of were heavily regulated.