2 ms·
Not being able to run arbitrary external code is kind of the whole point when building a security-oriented system. You remove (not just hide or disable, but re
by PeterisP 10y ago
Not being able to run arbitrary external code is kind of the whole point when building a security-oriented system.
You remove (not just hide or disable, but remove) everything that's not absolutely necessary, and the ideal result is a system that cannot run anything but a very small list of whitelisted binaries.
- jarym 10y agothat may be the 'ideal' result but judging by the number of 0-day exploits it will not be the reality. Even Apple let you side load apps onto an iOS device if you're a developer... Microsoft is definitely setting it up for a stumble (again) similar to WinRT.
- UK-AL 10y agoYou can probably side load uwp apps if you want to.
- blackoil 10y agoYou can also sideload app all you want, just upgrade for 10S to home/pro/..
- PeterisP 10y agoThe way to protect against 0-day exploits is to have a smaller attack surface. If you remove stuff from the OS, you're not vulnerable to 0-days in that stuff anymore. They're not intended to be developer machines - imagine the recent UK NHS WannaCry situation; it would be very, very nice if most of these NHS systems were running a locked down not-general purpose OS. If you're deploying a hundred "office PC appliances", then you'd prefer if they could not be simply sideloaded with stuff to make them developer machines, you'd want a clear separation between that - e.g. installing the normal Win 10 instead of Win 10S.
- panzer_wyrm 10y agoWho will do the whitelist? The end user or ms? Solitary confinement has the side effect of being both very secure, while being a torture.