In the 447 incident, the pilots were often giving contravening inputs, and nothing was communicating either the contradiction or the computer's resolution to th

In the 447 incident, the pilots were often giving contravening inputs, and nothing was communicating either the contradiction or the computer's resolution to the contradiction. Bad design. And the user interface for the computer indicating its own confusion, was a bogus overspeed warning when in fact the plane was stalling. There was no sensor failure causing that miscommunication, it's how the system was designed, but it only behaved that way in a particular software abstraction mode (one of the alternate laws), and there's no unambiguous UI to know what law applied. The cockpit was also dark, and there was severe turbulence. Anyway, there is no such thing as an override when it's fly by wire. An "override" is just a different level of software abstraction, it's yet another mode, with yet another set of rules. And that's what I think is bullshit, are the layered rules. It's such bullshit it makes me angry. This is how the myth started that Airbus's can't be stalled, the computer won't let you do that. True in normal mode, and complete bull fucking shit in at least one of its alternate modes.