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> We're also far past the point where human pilots and crew might be able to do something about it. I disagree. In the incident described in the article, the p
by pdonis 10y ago
> We're also far past the point where human pilots and crew might be able to do something about it.
I disagree. In the incident described in the article, the pilot could have prevented all of the damage--if only the airplane had responded to his control inputs. This was not a situation that would have been hard for a human to handle--if the human had had the ability to tell the airplane: stop listening to the computers and just listen to me.
> The real solution is redundancy.
There was plenty of redundancy in this case. It didn't help.
I think the real solution is, as I said above, to give the human pilot a last-ditch way of regaining complete manual control of the plane. After all, that's what the human is there for: to intervene if it is clear that the automation is doing the wrong thing. That was clearly the case here, but the humans had no way to stop it. That is not a good idea.
- cbanek 10y ago> I think the real solution is, as I said above, to give the human pilot a last-ditch way of regaining complete manual control of the plane. This was my point all along, there is no such thing as "manual control" anymore. It's all a big system working in concert, even moving the control surfaces. And as systems get more complicated, and start to require faster than human response speeds, it will be even less "manual control".
- pdonis 10y ago> there is no such thing as "manual control" anymore It's one thing to not have direct hydraulic or mechanical connections to the control surfaces. You can still have a direct wire from the controls in the cockpit to the actuators that move the control surfaces, with no computer intervention. It's another thing to have no way to get the faulty computers out of the way and get that direct wire to the actuators. > as systems get more complicated, and start to require faster than human response speeds That might be the case for some systems, but it isn't the case for airliners. If it were, humans would not have been able to fly them before fly-by-wire controlled by computers came along.
- cbanek 10y ago> That might be the case for some systems, but it isn't the case for airliners. Some planes like the U-2 are notoriously hard to fly, and spacecraft definitely require very fast reaction speeds. > You can still have a direct wire from the controls in the cockpit to the actuators that move the control surfaces, with no computer intervention. Not likely. You'll probably still need digital electronics to check that you aren't violating range of motion stops, or overtaxing the part or pushing it past its limits. Then to move one wing or do some logical action, you're really twiddling a dozen or more wires at the same time, in just the right way. That requires a different control mechanism that basically mimics the flight computer, and it's not something that I think a human or even a pair of humans can do. Now let's say you can wire everything up, and actually control it. That's so much wire which is a maintenance nightmare (just imagine if a few of these wires broke, and you didn't figure it out until you tried it). Not to mention the extreme weight of millions of long cable runs to the front of the aircraft. > If it were, humans would not have been able to fly them before fly-by-wire controlled by computers came along. I don't think airliners would be even close to where they are today without fly-by-wire. It's a game changing technology.
- pdonis 10y ago> Some planes like the U-2 are notoriously hard to fly Yes, because of the high altitude, which makes the safe flight regime much narrower. An airliner doesn't fly that high. > spacecraft definitely require very fast reaction speeds. Yes, but a spacecraft isn't an airliner. I specifically said it isn't the case for airliners. > You'll probably still need digital electronics to check that you aren't violating range of motion stops, or overtaxing the part or pushing it past its limits. Possibly. But those electronics should be separate from the automated flight computer. Btw, by "wire" I just meant "a direct means of sending information". It doesn't have to be a mechanical wire and pulley. I'm just saying that there ought to be a way of cutting out the flight computer's automated decision making and just letting the pilot's control inputs drive the control surfaces. > to move one wing or do some logical action, you're really twiddling a dozen or more wires at the same time, in just the right way There's no "twiddling". See above. > That's so much wire No, it's the same wire that already goes from the cockpit to the control actuators. See above. > I don't think airliners would be even close to where they are today without fly-by-wire In terms of comfort, convenience, and more economical operation when everything is working properly, sure, I absolutely agree. But as far as the basics of flight are concerned, they're still the same. It shouldn't be possible for a plane that was in safe straight and level flight to suddenly go haywire without the pilots being able to stop it, just because some computer crashed.
- bsder 10y ago> In the incident described in the article, the pilot could have prevented all of the damage--if only the airplane had responded to his control inputs. Except that this is ALSO a failure mode: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 I suspect that the real problem is that the aerospace programmers still regard the humans as a "last ditch" recovery point when that is now totally infeasible. The programming needs to start assuming that it gets no help but needs to recover anyway. For a more terrestrial example, both Three Mile Island and Fukushima would have turned out better if the humans had sat on their hands and done NOTHING.
- cbanek 10y agoThat's an excellent point. Even if it's not the people, the stick or manual control inputs are also a point of failure. So if suddenly your stick does something strange, and your flight computer allows it (thinking human knows best) you are in big trouble. The opposite of this is the ground collision avoidance systems, where the humans are one of the weakest parts of the aircraft (due to G-loc). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WkZGL7RQBVw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WkZGL7RQBVw
- pdonis 10y ago> Except that this is ALSO a failure mode Yes, it is. But in the Air France incident, there was faulty data from the airspeed indicators; the computers were incapable of flying the aircraft under those conditions, so there was no choice but to let the humans try. They failed, but that's not an argument for not letting them try if the computers would have also failed. In the Quantas incident, there was no faulty instrument data as far as I can tell; it was just a computer crash. So the human would have done fine if only given the chance. > The programming needs to start assuming that it gets no help but needs to recover anyway. How can that happen if the computer crashes? Or if the instruments are giving faulty data? Unless and until we have artificial intelligence equal to that of humans, I don't see how you can not have a way for the human to have some last ditch way of overriding the computer, since the human at least has some chance of handling conditions that the computer simply can't.
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- averagewall 10y agoThat assumes the human won't mistakenly misuse the manual override and cause a crash when the computer would otherwise have been fine on its own. Computers and humans are both fallible and it's not obvious that the human should be given higher authority than the computer. There isn't a simple answer to this kind of problem. Ultimately someone or something has to make decisions based on sensor data/vision/etc and that something or someone might always get it wrong.
- belovedeagle 10y agoThis reminds me of some dev tools (can't remember which ones) which require the user to do something like set an environment variable to "YES_THIS_IS_A_TERRIBLE_IDEA". If the switch to disable aircraft automation involves such cognitive barriers, it's possible that pilots could be relied upon not to use it except when truly necessary. Heck, the barrier could be that pilots aren't told of its existence until contacting maintenance. It sounds silly and useless but it would have offered greater assurance in this situation that landing could be done safely.
- rmccue 10y agoReact is notable for this: inserting HTML strings directly into the DOM uses `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`, and also has used names like `__SECRET_DOM_DO_NOT_USE_OR_YOU_WILL_BE_FIRED`: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11447020 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11447020
- averagewall 10y agoI don't know how hard it was to do, but here's a case of some Apollo astronauts who injured and nearly killed themselves by unnecessarily using manual override and doing it wrong. I suspect they know full well what it means but still decide that a special situation requires it. Not so much like a careless oversight as in programming. https://youtu.be/V-jRjyl7Fg4 https://youtu.be/V-jRjyl7Fg4 The story starts at 47:50. I can't quite get the link to jump straight to it.
- pdonis 10y ago> Computers and humans are both fallible and it's not obvious that the human should be given higher authority than the computer. I'm not saying the human should always be given higher authority than the computer. I'm saying that there should be some way, in a case where the human can tell that the computer is doing something obviously wrong, for the human to take higher authority in order to prevent the situation from worsening. Even if such an override were only possible in particular cases--for example, if a computer crashes or it is getting obviously wrong sensor data--that would be better than nothing at all.
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- exidy 10y agoEvery Airbus has this already: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes#Direct_law https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes#Direct_la...
- prewett 10y agoBut will the computer let you go to Direct Law? One of the problems with the Air France flight was it switched laws without them realizing it. I'm sure the pilots tried to put it in whatever mode is most like no computer intervention. And from the wikipedia article, it sounds like Direct Law isn't completely direct: the "maximum deflection of the elevators is limited for each configuration as a function of the current aircraft centre of gravity," which sounds like the computer still has some control.
- hlandau 10y agoI'd be surprised if the AF447 pilots didn't realise the aeroplane had reverted to a set of laws with fewer protections, as that was why the autopilot disconnected in the first place. If the autopilot spontaneously disconnects your first question is presumably going to be why. Then again, I'll probably never understand what the pilots of AF447 were thinking, and their actions lacked coherence. But I would expect a perceptive pilot to notice the change of law. Especially given the stall warning - normal law has full stall protection, so AFAIK hearing a stall warning is strongly indicative of non-normal law. AFAIK pilots can always revert to direct law by disabling the primary computers on the overhead panel. The article is curious though, because it states the pilots tried to reenable the third primary computer after it failed, which resulted in a second dive. They gave up on restarting it after that, but left the other primary computers engaged, but were concerned about whether the plane would behave. My (potentially misguided) instinct there would be to throw out the primary computers altogether as a precaution. It wouldn't surprise me if Airbus training encouraged pilots to always try to return to the maximum level of automation and envelope protection after a failure. In that context - the context of Airbus's culture - deliberately reverting to direct law could be seen as irresponsible, even if it seems like the opposite could be said to be the case in this incident. If so, it'd just be another way in which Airbus's approach to aviation raises questions...