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> You're describing a legal system and the rule of law. I'm not sure there's way to guarantee anything like you describe when there is some illegality in the na

> You're describing a legal system and the rule of law. I'm not sure there's way to guarantee anything like you describe when there is some illegality in the nature of the process. Legal systems aren't the only way to give confidence that both ends of a bargain will be held. As one example, some darknet markets have escrow systems for this purpose. It's not too hard to imagine a way to do this with ransomed code. Reputation-based systems also provide incentives for sellers to deliver on their promises.

Xylakant 9y ago
Escrow works well with physical goods. How do you return source code that can be copied endlessly. How many copies do you return? How do you prove that one of them is the "original" copy? Returning digital goods (or more general "knowledge") works either based on trust or through enforcement. The latter is the rule of law.
- kbenson 9y ago
  Even with physical goods, what type of agent would hold the trust of both the criminal and law-abiding elements of the deal? A criminal agent cannot be trusted by a law abiding party, and a law-abiding agent cannot be trusted by a criminal party (they can just give everything back to the rightful owner).
  - lawik 9y ago
    I think this sort of thing could be done using Etherium. Allowing exchange in a mechanical way with code that the parties can verify on their own. A programmed agent being quite impartial. Not sure how hard it would be. Of course, you can never verify that they will not release the code or keep using it maliciously.
    - kbenson 9y ago
      I think ethereal just hides the problem slightly. If it's information, as you say there's nothing preventing future use of it. If it's physical, there needs to be some holder of the item, and we're back at how can both sides trust the escrow agent?
      - lawik 9y ago
        Indeed. Hard to avoid an element of trust.
- iEchoic 9y ago
  > Escrow works well with physical goods. How do you return source code that can be copied endlessly. How many copies do you return? How do you prove that one of them is the "original" copy? Just brainstorming, but: 1. Trusted third party creates a service that (a) provides a one-time-use encryption key (b) provides an endpoint to upload an encrypted blob of information along with an email (or a passcode) and a date after which the decrypted content will be made available to that email (or via that passcode), (c) provides a UI that allows a user to pay $x (redeemable via email/passcode) to wipe the encrypted content from their server, if paid before the ransom date. 2. Malware author compromises system, encrypts content using (a), uploads encrypted content with their email/passcode to (b), sends user a link to (c). 3. Malware author provides some evidence that they haven't also uploaded non-encrypted content elsewhere to give confidence that once the user pays, the content will not exist elsewhere. Some ideas: system/network logs, malware analysis that shows that it only uploads to trusted third-party, providing proof in decompiled source that malware only uploads to trusted third-party, and/or a reputation/review system. Note that this doesn't need to be airtight proof, it just needs to give the victim enough confidence that they think it's worth the risk to hand over some money. Would this work well, in practice? Who knows. But I think it's a proof-of-concept that shows that there are potentially other ways to escrow ransomed content.
  - kbenson 9y ago
    > Malware author provides some evidence that they haven't also uploaded non-encrypted content elsewhere Any amount of information that could show this would invariably give away the identity of the hacker. Even then, since the information comes from them, it can't be trusted. > But I think it's a proof-of-concept that shows that there are potentially other ways to escrow ransomed content. There's a difference between keeping the owner from their own materials and threatening to spread those materials to others. In the first, you at least know whether you get the files back (for the most part, it might be hard to notice small changed/omissions). In the second, not only do you not necessarily know it's been shared, the blackmailer retains the right to spread it in perpetuity (whether it still retains value or not).
kbenson 9y ago
> As one example, some darknet markets have escrow systems for this purpose. Those only function because the darknet functions as the system, and the punishment for not following through is that the party loses access to or prestige in that market. What entity exists that is trusted and has leverage with both the people that are ransoming (criminals) and average citizens (ostensibly law abiding)? Should I trust a darknet broker to not screw me? No. They have no incentive not to, as long as their actual client, the ransomer, doesn't care. For the same reason, the ransomer should not trust any legal entity, because they can not deliver the money and give it back to the victim (since they are the client). There may exist a way for this to work, but I certainly can't think of one, and what you described doesn't work either. Trust is the integral factor as I see it, and while you can have trust within a criminal community, and within a law-abiding community, I'm not sure how you get that trust to cross that boundary.
- djmobley 9y ago
  A simple solution is the one you describe. A reputation system for ransomers. Time earned reputation for upholding promises.
  - kbenson 9y ago
    And how do you ensure you are dealing with the same person from one transaction to the next? Any authority that can confirm an anonymous criminal is who they say they are needs to be illegal to keep law enforcement from finding out the identities, and if not they are still participating in a crime. Again, how do you trust a criminal person or organization? By their nature, they don't follow the same rules.
    - iEchoic 9y ago
      > Any authority that can confirm an anonymous criminal is who they say they are needs to be illegal to keep law enforcement from finding out the identities, and if not they are still participating in a crime. It's not a requirement that the authority be legal. Note that a person's name isn't required to establish authority, pseudonymous reputation provides assurance as well. Darknet markets have reputation systems, and have already figured this out. > And how do you ensure you are dealing with the same person from one transaction to the next? The same way we do it with pseudonymous systems now: by having an authoritative identity somewhere that can verify their actions. @shittywatercolour could make a new account on HN, do an AMA, and post on his Twitter that he's doing an AMA with <name> for proof. Banksy can claim work by posting it on his website. In the same way, a reputable seller on any marketplace (such as a darknet marketplace) could do the same thing.

Xylakant 9y ago

Escrow works well with physical goods. How do you return source code that can be copied endlessly. How many copies do you return? How do you prove that one of them is the "original" copy? Returning digital goods (or more general "knowledge") works either based on trust or through enforcement. The latter is the rule of law.

kbenson 9y ago
Even with physical goods, what type of agent would hold the trust of both the criminal and law-abiding elements of the deal? A criminal agent cannot be trusted by a law abiding party, and a law-abiding agent cannot be trusted by a criminal party (they can just give everything back to the rightful owner).
- lawik 9y ago
  I think this sort of thing could be done using Etherium. Allowing exchange in a mechanical way with code that the parties can verify on their own. A programmed agent being quite impartial. Not sure how hard it would be. Of course, you can never verify that they will not release the code or keep using it maliciously.
  - kbenson 9y ago
    I think ethereal just hides the problem slightly. If it's information, as you say there's nothing preventing future use of it. If it's physical, there needs to be some holder of the item, and we're back at how can both sides trust the escrow agent?
    - lawik 9y ago
      Indeed. Hard to avoid an element of trust.
iEchoic 9y ago
> Escrow works well with physical goods. How do you return source code that can be copied endlessly. How many copies do you return? How do you prove that one of them is the "original" copy? Just brainstorming, but: 1. Trusted third party creates a service that (a) provides a one-time-use encryption key (b) provides an endpoint to upload an encrypted blob of information along with an email (or a passcode) and a date after which the decrypted content will be made available to that email (or via that passcode), (c) provides a UI that allows a user to pay $x (redeemable via email/passcode) to wipe the encrypted content from their server, if paid before the ransom date. 2. Malware author compromises system, encrypts content using (a), uploads encrypted content with their email/passcode to (b), sends user a link to (c). 3. Malware author provides some evidence that they haven't also uploaded non-encrypted content elsewhere to give confidence that once the user pays, the content will not exist elsewhere. Some ideas: system/network logs, malware analysis that shows that it only uploads to trusted third-party, providing proof in decompiled source that malware only uploads to trusted third-party, and/or a reputation/review system. Note that this doesn't need to be airtight proof, it just needs to give the victim enough confidence that they think it's worth the risk to hand over some money. Would this work well, in practice? Who knows. But I think it's a proof-of-concept that shows that there are potentially other ways to escrow ransomed content.
- kbenson 9y ago
  > Malware author provides some evidence that they haven't also uploaded non-encrypted content elsewhere Any amount of information that could show this would invariably give away the identity of the hacker. Even then, since the information comes from them, it can't be trusted. > But I think it's a proof-of-concept that shows that there are potentially other ways to escrow ransomed content. There's a difference between keeping the owner from their own materials and threatening to spread those materials to others. In the first, you at least know whether you get the files back (for the most part, it might be hard to notice small changed/omissions). In the second, not only do you not necessarily know it's been shared, the blackmailer retains the right to spread it in perpetuity (whether it still retains value or not).

kbenson 9y ago

> As one example, some darknet markets have escrow systems for this purpose. Those only function because the darknet functions as the system, and the punishment for not following through is that the party loses access to or prestige in that market. What entity exists that is trusted and has leverage with both the people that are ransoming (criminals) and average citizens (ostensibly law abiding)? Should I trust a darknet broker to not screw me? No. They have no incentive not to, as long as their actual client, the ransomer, doesn't care. For the same reason, the ransomer should not trust any legal entity, because they can not deliver the money and give it back to the victim (since they are the client). There may exist a way for this to work, but I certainly can't think of one, and what you described doesn't work either. Trust is the integral factor as I see it, and while you can have trust within a criminal community, and within a law-abiding community, I'm not sure how you get that trust to cross that boundary.

djmobley 9y ago
A simple solution is the one you describe. A reputation system for ransomers. Time earned reputation for upholding promises.
- kbenson 9y ago
  And how do you ensure you are dealing with the same person from one transaction to the next? Any authority that can confirm an anonymous criminal is who they say they are needs to be illegal to keep law enforcement from finding out the identities, and if not they are still participating in a crime. Again, how do you trust a criminal person or organization? By their nature, they don't follow the same rules.
  - iEchoic 9y ago
    > Any authority that can confirm an anonymous criminal is who they say they are needs to be illegal to keep law enforcement from finding out the identities, and if not they are still participating in a crime. It's not a requirement that the authority be legal. Note that a person's name isn't required to establish authority, pseudonymous reputation provides assurance as well. Darknet markets have reputation systems, and have already figured this out. > And how do you ensure you are dealing with the same person from one transaction to the next? The same way we do it with pseudonymous systems now: by having an authoritative identity somewhere that can verify their actions. @shittywatercolour could make a new account on HN, do an AMA, and post on his Twitter that he's doing an AMA with <name> for proof. Banksy can claim work by posting it on his website. In the same way, a reputable seller on any marketplace (such as a darknet marketplace) could do the same thing.