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Not clear At all clear that at Jutland lack of individual initiative swung the battle. The battle was fairly skilfully fought between two state of the art comb
by hardlianotion 9y ago
Not clear At all clear that at Jutland lack of individual initiative swung the battle. The battle was fairly skilfully fought between two state of the art combatants and errors of judgement, while costly, were retrieved on both sides, making the affair something of a score draw.
Betty's taking the initiative the way he did without telling Jellicoe what he faced or where he was going could have cost Britain the battle, as Beattie sailed into the German trap. Scheer's about turn when his T was crossed saved the fleet, so you could say the superb manoeuvring discipline of the German fleet saved it. You could also say that prioritising speed and heavy gunnery over armour (German ships prioritised armour) in the British battle cruisers didn't help them when they came up against German battleships. Or that the German gunnery was superior, or that the British munitions appeared to malfunction (or was that the German armour). There was, however, at least one instance in which faulty signalling from Beatty's flagship was very costly.
I think I understand the point the author is trying to make, but I would need a much clearer account of what he thought went wrong at Jutland to appreciate or agree with it.
- etrevino 9y agoYou raised the same issues I was going to. The only instance I can think of where command ossification may have hurt the British was during the night actions, when the (German) High Seas Fleet was escaping across the wake of the (British) Grand Fleet. At that point there was a chance for British capital ships to engage-- they'd seen the Germans-- but they deferred the decision up the chain of command. The rear admiral in charge of the squadron declined to attack without an order from Jellicoe, but Jellicoe wasn't told the situation, so he assumed that the contacts to his rear were German harassing attacks. That allowed the remainder of the High Seas Fleet to escape. Quick edit: though difficult with all of the smoke, the flag signalling did work as intended at Jutland. Flag signalling relies heavily on skilled signal officers. Beattie did not have a good one, which is why he didn't get a crushing victory at Dogger Bank (his signaler sent his entire squadron after the wrong ship). Jellicoe managed to maneuver the fleet quite well once the main battle commenced.
- hardlianotion 9y agoI think the signalling at Dogger Bank may have been what I had in mind - not Jutland, though. Agreed about Jellicoe as well - it seems miraculous to me that Beatty managed to muddy Jellicoe's reputation after the war.
- foldr 9y agoJust a pedantic note. British gunnery was actually pretty good at Jutland (see e.g. here http://www.jutland1916.com/tactics-and-technologies-4/gunnery-performance/ http://www.jutland1916.com/tactics-and-technologies-4/gunner... and here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damage_to_major_ships_at_the_Battle_of_Jutland https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damage_to_major_ships_at_the_B...). The German gunnery was more obviously effective because it succeeded in blowing up some of the battlecruisers, but in terms of accuracy and hits landed, the British ships put in a pretty good performance.
- willvarfar 9y agoYes. The British had an Achilles heal in the way it was normal to have hatches open and charged stashed between turret and magazine to increase rate-of-fire. A good piece on this: http://www.jutland1916.com/tactics-and-technologies-4/battleship-design-and-anti-flash/ http://www.jutland1916.com/tactics-and-technologies-4/battle...
- rhcom2 9y agoWow. Those accuracy number are crazy, I had no idea they would be so low (<5%).
- foldr 9y agoHitting a moving target over 10,000 yards away from a moving platform using optical rangefinders and analogue fire control computers. It's a miracle they ever hit anything IMHO.
- hardlianotion 9y agoHedging bets with three different spellings of Beatty (I think this is correct spelling now...)
- smacktoward 9y ago> I think I understand the point the author is trying to make, but I would need a much clearer account of what he thought went wrong at Jutland to appreciate or agree with it. To get that account I highly recommend jumping straight to the book the article cites at the top, Andrew Gordon's The Rules of the Game; it's a brilliant work, packed with detail but accessibly written and clearly argued. This article recapitulates some of Gordon's arguments, but the book itself is such a pleasure to read that if you are at all interested in the subject you owe it to yourself to check it out.