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I was going to say that in the field of safety-critical systems, there is a whole lexicon of ways to describe things going wrong, and this was probably just a w
by mannykannot 10y ago
I was going to say that in the field of safety-critical systems, there is a whole lexicon of ways to describe things going wrong, and this was probably just a way to discuss the problem with precision. I was curious, however, as to how a triply-redundant system could lead to this outcome, so I have been reading the report, and I came across this [my emphasis]:
"Although there were many injuries on the 7 October 2008 flight, it is very unlikely
that the FCPC design limitation could have been associated with a more adverse
outcome. Accordingly, the occurrence fitted the classification of a ‘hazardous’
effect rather than a ‘catastrophic’ effect as described by the relevant certification
requirements.
Really? The pilots were certainly worried about a "more adverse outcome" if it recurred near the ground.
This statement is followed by an apparent justification:
"As the occurrence was the only known case of the design limitation
affecting an aircraft’s flightpath in over 28 million flight hours on A330/A340
aircraft, the limitation was within the acceptable probability range defined in the
certification requirements for a hazardous effect.
This non-sequitur seems to say that because such faults don't happen very often, such events are merely hazardous (unless they mean even the occasional total loss of an airplane and all aboard does not count as catastrophic.) This is followed by an enumeration of quality-assurance practices, as if they argued for this event not having happened.
I guess I will have to read the whole report to find out why this failure in a triply-redundant system does not raise deep concerns about its architecture.
- mannykannot 10y agoSection 5.2.2 explains why the investigation concluded a more adverse outcome was unlikely. The explanation depends on five rules that should collectively prevent it happening much more violently, more than twice, or at low altitude. This last point leaves me wondering why such a violent response was justified. I have not yet found an explanation why it is not a concern that one faulty system could override two functioning ones. The report says "Flight simulations also showed that an undesired pitch-down just above 500 ft would be easily recoverable by a flight crew." It does not say if that was two events in close succession, or whether the crew were primed for the test.