4 ms·
OK, how about this. I offer FDE as a service, anonymously via Tor. Your Linux machine uses LUKS, with remote unlocking via dropbear. But you don't have the decr
by mirimir 10y ago
OK, how about this. I offer FDE as a service, anonymously via Tor. Your Linux machine uses LUKS, with remote unlocking via dropbear. But you don't have the decryption passphrase. Before booting, you must alert me via Signal with video, stating that you are not under coercion, with identity and time verification. Then I SSH via Tor, and unlock your machine.
The argument is that authorities can't force you to lie to me, in order to get your machine unlocked. And you don't need to lie to them, either.
But of course, you'd need to trust me implicitly ;)
- Canada 10y agoYou could add shamir secret sharing and restrict your remote access to running a program that accepts your secret.
- mirimir 10y agoSure. I don't know how to integrate that with LUKS, however. But even so, once I had remote SSH access to initramfs, and had unlocked LUKS, I could mount /root and mess with the system, adding my own trusted key for remote access, etc. So basically, users would need to trust me fully.
- Canada 10y agoYour special login shell would not allow you to do anything except provide your secret, after which you are simply disconnected without having the opportunity to do anything else. A different process not under your control would mount the volume. At no point would you get to execute arbitrary commands or open any files. You would only have to be trusted not to hold your secret for ransom.
- komali2 10y agoThen exactly what happened here occurs - he gets arrested for not unlocking his laptop, I'd imagine.
- mirimir 10y agoExcept, as I say above, it's not his laptop. It's mine, and I'm just letting him use it. If they want access to it, they can come after me :)
- openasocket 10y agoIt's a cute scenario. I'm not a lawyer, but I'm fairly sure they can compel me to lie to you. I think the standard is that the police can, at least with a warrant, compel you to do anything that you would do normally. For instance, if you're a company that keeps a database of user actions, they can compel you to give them access to that database, because accessing that data is a part of your normal business process. They can even compel you to write some software to extract the specific data they need (within reason). And in your scenario, I am able to access my own computer, and do so regularly as part of my normal life. You probably came up with this scenario thinking about so-called "warrant canaries," which hinge on law enforcement not being able to force companies to lie to their users. But it should be noted there is no case law or precedent regarding warrant canaries, and the legal consensus seems to be it is unlikely to hold up in court.
- mirimir 10y agoYes, I was thinking of warrant canaries. I'm also unaware of case law or precedent. But I do note that Riseup did not update its warrant canary while under subpoena. This generated considerable controversy. But Riseup made no statement either way, except for this enigmatic tweet: listen to the hummingbird, whose wings you cannot see, listen to the hummingbird, don't listen to me. #LeonardCohenpic.twitter.com/PZisFt6mHm — riseup.net (@riseupnet) November 11, 2016 So it seemed to work, and I haven't seen any fallout. How about this. When you use my FDE as a service, part of my payment is selling your computer to me for a nominal fee. So you're never using your computer, you're using mine. And my lease agreement requires confirmation that you're not under compulsion. Fantasizing a bit, one can imagine a multi-probe EEG net that could report your state of mind. Perhaps the remote processor could be trained to recognize coercion, nervousness, etc.
- openasocket 10y ago> my lease agreement requires confirmation that you're not under compulsion. You can't have a "no cops" requirement in a lease agreement, that wouldn't be remotely enforceable. > Fantasizing a bit, one can imagine a multi-probe EEG net that could report your state of mind Ordinarily, at this point, the warrant would then be given to you, not me. This is complicated by the fact that you presumably are trying to stay anonymous and there are questions of jurisdiction. But they will at least try to contact you and compel you to give them access. If you refuse now you're committing a crime, and they'll go after you. So you'd better hope your OPSEC is solid. And, after a certain point of ridiculousness, they might go after me, saying I purposefully used this system to elude lawful requests for access (which would be true!). That's going to be tricky to prove, and at that point I don't have enough legal knowledge to figure out if that holds up.
- wiz21c 10y agoI'm sure in this kind of human rights stuff the problem is absolutely not technical. It's just a detail. What counts is to be able to put yourself in a position where you can be defended by a lawyer or whatever support (like an Ecuadorian embassy ? :-) ). Trying to technologically sidestep the law enforcement is just ridiculous. It proves that you recognize you're doing wrong stuff (wrong in the eyes of those running after you), it sends a very bad signal. And anyway, as said elsewhere, at some point you are opposing a government. And if you're opposing in a strong way, then well, you basically declared war and you'll have to fight the Goliath. Thus before attempting any fight, make sure you have a very good network of supporters... Technology won't help :-(
- mirimir 10y agoIn my experience, changing unjust laws is at least as hard. Consider the fights against slavery, for women's rights, to end segregation, for gay rights, for gender freedom, and generally for decriminalization of all victimless crimes. Privacy has arguably played key roles for all of them. For peer discussion, for organizing and logistics, for fund-raising, etc. And technology has always played a key role in protecting privacy.
- wiz21c 10y agoyep. I was talking about using technology to protect against an ongoing threat. Technology can help to make myself invisible but as soon as the opposing force gets me, it's very tough to use technology to keep invisibility... So I'll use Tor and Tox to hide myself as long as possible. But when the bad guys rings my bell, I know the only way out is to burn everything. They won't be deterred by some 2048 bits password...
- mirimir 10y agoYes, my thoughts exactly :) Based on an OPSEC risk assessment, it may seem rather unlikely that the NSA and other national intelligence agencies are adversaries. Why would they care about Mirimir? However, I find it useful to assume that they are. And so I employ many countermeasures that might seem foolish. Basically, I do whatever is workable. And then I write about it for income and pleasure. I do keep in mind, however, the "possibility that [a] countermeasure could create an OPSEC indicator" (DoD OPSEC manual at p. 14).[0] But burning everything, that's also obstruction, I think. 0) https://www.OPSECprofessionals.org/official/081103_DOD_OPSEC_Manual.pdf">DoD https://www.OPSECprofessionals.org/official/081103_DOD_OPSEC... OPSEC manual