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I disagree with most of his points, but what really bothers me is the underlying message of his article. I don't think we should fool ourselves into thinking we
by exabrial 10y ago
I disagree with most of his points, but what really bothers me is the underlying message of his article. I don't think we should fool ourselves into thinking we can design a protocol that isn't susceptible to implementation problems.
Did we get SSL/TLS right? No, we've failed a few times, but we're doing better. Why is that? People are paying attention more that ever to OpenSSL and now we have competition with LibreSSL and the like.
Side note: The irony of his coupler example; it's a flawed spec, not flawed implementations... the implementations followed the spec but the spec was dangerous from the start. JWT is the opposite: good spec, but a long time ago some early adopters didn't get things right.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- unscaled 10y agoI guess heartbleed gave everybody the wrong image, but most TLS vulnerabilities were vulnerabilities in the spec. The fixes to RC4, BEAST, SWEET32, POODLE, LOGJAM, CRIME, BREACH, BRICK, BORKED, BUSTED and whatever else you could think of - all involved changing the spec. Sometimes by adding mitigations, but mostly by banning TLS features. TLS is a legacy protocol. Nobody likes it very much, but it's such an established standard that you don't have much choice than trying to fix it. The same might happen to JWT, but in both cases we'll be fixing the specs, not just the implementations.
- exabrial 10y agoTLS1.2 seems to be pretty secure... I think upcoming TLS1.3 will be very secure, and it's supposed to decrease latency.
- staticassertion 10y agoYou could look at SMACK TLS as a few dozen examples of implementation specific features due solely to the complexity of representing TLS state machines. These aren't protocol weaknesses, they're weaknesses in the implementation due to complexities in the protocol.