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For Transmission, the infected binary was signed as well: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/30/osxkeydnap-spreads-via-signed-transmission-application/ http
by runeks 10y ago
For Transmission, the infected binary was signed as well: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/30/osxkeydnap-spreads-via-signed-transmission-application/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/30/osxkeydnap-spreads...
Signing doesn't help unless you know which public key to trust.
- abalone 10y agoSigning does help! Apple can revoke the certificate the instant the malware is discovered, blocking all future installs. Whereas Handbrake is going to rely on XProtect[1] which entails Apple refreshing all Macs in the universe at some delay. While I'm at it, distributing through the Mac App Store would have added further protection against this attack on a couple levels. 1) It's harder to compromise with a MITM attack in the first place. 2) macOS wouldn't install an update signed by another party like this. [1] "We have been informed that the process to update the definitions for OSX's XProtect feature started this morning, so this should start rolling out to machines automatically soon if not already."
- rovr138 10y agoOkay, but the damaged would have already been done. >Further Actions Required > Based on the information we have, you must also change all the passwords that may reside in your OSX KeyChain or any browser password stores.
- abalone 10y agoNot exactly. Signing would have minimized the overall damage by letting Gatekeeper halt all installs from pretty much the moment the malware was discovered. And distributing through the Mac App Store would have prevented this MITM attack in the first place.