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I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is

I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that very property by which I experience inference (among myriad other things). I do not have to (indeed, cannot) infer it. Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness. If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.

naasking 9y ago
I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers). Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?
- monktastic1 9y ago
  It is not that I think consciousness is required for inference, but that my own process of inference takes place in/via what I'm calling consciousness, and I'm guessing (but cannot be sure that) the same is happening for you. This is why I ask: does it seem to you that anything at all is happening? Your answer cannot tell me whether you are conscious (or a p-zombie who is lying), but it may help you see what I'm getting at. If you ask me to be more precise (about "seem" or "happening"), I cannot. I can only trust that you are able to understand me. If it does seem that something is happening, that is consciousness. If you answer that it's an illusion, and it may not really seem, but only seem to seem, that's still good enough. So I can't tell you "how" I can be certain that something seems to be happening, and I cannot prove it to anybody else, but it certainly does seem.
  - naasking 9y ago
    But seeming to seem is not the same as seeming, so you can't hold both to be true simultaneously. This whole thread had been about whether seeming actually happens at all. For instance, I've consistently stated that experience doesn't really exist, that it's an illusion, and so p-zombies can't exist. As I said earlier, I acknowledge I have "consciousness", but this doesn't necessarily entail the same set of properteies you expect. I am totally behind the idea that consciousness is an informational property, but that hasn't been the impression I've gotten from your posts.
    - monktastic1 9y ago
      But seeming to seem is a form of seeming. And the only form of illusion I know of requires seeming: things seem one way but are actually another. I simply do not understand what it means to doubt or deny that it seems like something is happening (though it's perfectly clear to me what it means to doubt that something is actually happening). When I see (and even accept) a proof of it, will I say "well it sure seems like something is happening, but I'm wrong, so it doesn't really seem like anything is happening?" Perhaps my imagination is limited. I thank you for trying!
      - naasking 9y ago
        > But seeming to seem is a form of seeming. And the only form of illusion I know of requires seeming: things seem one way but are actually another. When direct perception implies a false conclusion, that's an illusion. What else could "seems" actually mean? So now we're down to the meaning of the word "perception". I hope you also agree that there's no need to imbue some subjective subtext into this word, so where else can subjectivity hide?

naasking 9y ago

I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers). Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?

monktastic1 9y ago
It is not that I think consciousness is required for inference, but that my own process of inference takes place in/via what I'm calling consciousness, and I'm guessing (but cannot be sure that) the same is happening for you. This is why I ask: does it seem to you that anything at all is happening? Your answer cannot tell me whether you are conscious (or a p-zombie who is lying), but it may help you see what I'm getting at. If you ask me to be more precise (about "seem" or "happening"), I cannot. I can only trust that you are able to understand me. If it does seem that something is happening, that is consciousness. If you answer that it's an illusion, and it may not really seem, but only seem to seem, that's still good enough. So I can't tell you "how" I can be certain that something seems to be happening, and I cannot prove it to anybody else, but it certainly does seem.
- naasking 9y ago
  But seeming to seem is not the same as seeming, so you can't hold both to be true simultaneously. This whole thread had been about whether seeming actually happens at all. For instance, I've consistently stated that experience doesn't really exist, that it's an illusion, and so p-zombies can't exist. As I said earlier, I acknowledge I have "consciousness", but this doesn't necessarily entail the same set of properteies you expect. I am totally behind the idea that consciousness is an informational property, but that hasn't been the impression I've gotten from your posts.
  - monktastic1 9y ago
    But seeming to seem is a form of seeming. And the only form of illusion I know of requires seeming: things seem one way but are actually another. I simply do not understand what it means to doubt or deny that it seems like something is happening (though it's perfectly clear to me what it means to doubt that something is actually happening). When I see (and even accept) a proof of it, will I say "well it sure seems like something is happening, but I'm wrong, so it doesn't really seem like anything is happening?" Perhaps my imagination is limited. I thank you for trying!
    - naasking 9y ago
      > But seeming to seem is a form of seeming. And the only form of illusion I know of requires seeming: things seem one way but are actually another. When direct perception implies a false conclusion, that's an illusion. What else could "seems" actually mean? So now we're down to the meaning of the word "perception". I hope you also agree that there's no need to imbue some subjective subtext into this word, so where else can subjectivity hide?