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What does it mean for there to be an objective "element" to subjectivity (which here I take to be synonymous with consciousness)? And do you agree with naaskin

What does it mean for there to be an objective "element" to subjectivity (which here I take to be synonymous with consciousness)? And do you agree with naasking's claim above that it is meaningful to refute your own consciousness?

naasking 9y ago
Quantum physics tells me cars don't really exist, they're just one more aggregate of matter really no different than any other aggregate. But when you say "consciousness exists", you mean something different than when you say "cars exist". We both know cars don't really exist, fundamentally, but if you believe in irreducible subjectivity then you believe that consciousness fundamentally exists in the same way that quarks and fields exist. So I do walk around and claim to be conscious just like I walk around and talk about the drive to work every morning, but I always know in the back of my mind that these are merely convenient labels, not things that actually exist. They are merely shorthands for a very complicated description of objective reality.
- monktastic1 9y ago
  I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that very property by which I experience inference (among myriad other things). I do not have to (indeed, cannot) infer it. Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness. If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.
  - naasking 9y ago
    I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers). Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?
    - monktastic1 9y ago
      It is not that I think consciousness is required for inference, but that my own process of inference takes place in/via what I'm calling consciousness, and I'm guessing (but cannot be sure that) the same is happening for you. This is why I ask: does it seem to you that anything at all is happening? Your answer cannot tell me whether you are conscious (or a p-zombie who is lying), but it may help you see what I'm getting at. If you ask me to be more precise (about "seem" or "happening"), I cannot. I can only trust that you are able to understand me. If it does seem that something is happening, that is consciousness. If you answer that it's an illusion, and it may not really seem, but only seem to seem, that's still good enough. So I can't tell you "how" I can be certain that something seems to be happening, and I cannot prove it to anybody else, but it certainly does seem.
      - naasking 9y ago
        But seeming to seem is not the same as seeming, so you can't hold both to be true simultaneously. This whole thread had been about whether seeming actually happens at all. For instance, I've consistently stated that experience doesn't really exist, that it's an illusion, and so p-zombies can't exist. As I said earlier, I acknowledge I have "consciousness", but this doesn't necessarily entail the same set of properteies you expect. I am totally behind the idea that consciousness is an informational property, but that hasn't been the impression I've gotten from your posts.
        monktastic1 9y ago
        But seeming to seem is a form of seeming. And the only form of illusion I know of requires seeming: things seem one way but are actually another. I simply do not understand what it means to doubt or deny that it seems like something is happening (though it's perfectly clear to me what it means to doubt that something is actually happening). When I see (and even accept) a proof of it, will I say "well it sure seems like something is happening, but I'm wrong, so it doesn't really seem like anything is happening?" Perhaps my imagination is limited. I thank you for trying!
mannykannot 9y ago
Let's take another look at the statement that introduced that phrase: "Consciousness is entirely subjective. There is no objective element to it." This is typical of a certain sort of internet comment, the incomplete argument. Here, the first sentence is presented as if a self-evident truth, and the second as if it inarguably follows from the first, but collyw omitted to state what he meant by "entirely subjective" and "objective element", let alone present any argument for his two assertions. Despite that, my impression is that collw is trying to suggest (perhaps without committing to an argument that could be challenged) that the claimed total subjectivity of consciousness excludes it from having any objective aspect. This, of course, is the form of qualia-based arguments for dualism / against strong AI, where the specific objective aspect they allegedly rule out is that consciousness could arise from physical processes. My only point here is that the argument "subjective implies not objective" is not axiomatic, and anyone advancing that argument has an obligation to justify the mutual exclusion, for whatever specific definition of 'subjective' and 'objective' they are using (they also, of course, have to justify that their definitions of subjective and objective are accurate characterizations of the specific things they are talking about.) I am not sure that your second question accurately represents naasking's views, but I will say that while things like mood changes and drugs raise questions as to how well I know even my own consciousness, I don't really question that there is something there (I will get to the 'really' bit presently.) That self-knowledge on my part does not, however, extend to your consciousness (or anyone else's.) It has belatedly occurred to me that you are trying to draw a line between everyone's consciousness, as being something that you say certainly exists, and everything else, that might not "really" exist. If so, then you cannot do it: any argument that distinguishes knowledge of the external world from your self-knowledge of your own consciousness puts other people's consciousness on a par with the rest of the external world. As far as I can tell, that makes the position indistinguishable from solipsism. My take on solipsism is that you cannot prove or disprove it: it stands as a demonstration of the limits of reason, and for all practical purposes, you have to take the methodological assumption that it is false simply in order for the conversation to continue - anything we conclude is, at best, only true up to solipsism (or up to being in a simulation, which I think we both agree is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to solipsism in this regard.) This, by the way, is why I included 'really' in "I don't really question that there is something there."

naasking 9y ago

Quantum physics tells me cars don't really exist, they're just one more aggregate of matter really no different than any other aggregate. But when you say "consciousness exists", you mean something different than when you say "cars exist". We both know cars don't really exist, fundamentally, but if you believe in irreducible subjectivity then you believe that consciousness fundamentally exists in the same way that quarks and fields exist. So I do walk around and claim to be conscious just like I walk around and talk about the drive to work every morning, but I always know in the back of my mind that these are merely convenient labels, not things that actually exist. They are merely shorthands for a very complicated description of objective reality.

monktastic1 9y ago
I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that very property by which I experience inference (among myriad other things). I do not have to (indeed, cannot) infer it. Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness. If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.
- naasking 9y ago
  I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers). Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?
  - monktastic1 9y ago
    It is not that I think consciousness is required for inference, but that my own process of inference takes place in/via what I'm calling consciousness, and I'm guessing (but cannot be sure that) the same is happening for you. This is why I ask: does it seem to you that anything at all is happening? Your answer cannot tell me whether you are conscious (or a p-zombie who is lying), but it may help you see what I'm getting at. If you ask me to be more precise (about "seem" or "happening"), I cannot. I can only trust that you are able to understand me. If it does seem that something is happening, that is consciousness. If you answer that it's an illusion, and it may not really seem, but only seem to seem, that's still good enough. So I can't tell you "how" I can be certain that something seems to be happening, and I cannot prove it to anybody else, but it certainly does seem.
    - naasking 9y ago
      But seeming to seem is not the same as seeming, so you can't hold both to be true simultaneously. This whole thread had been about whether seeming actually happens at all. For instance, I've consistently stated that experience doesn't really exist, that it's an illusion, and so p-zombies can't exist. As I said earlier, I acknowledge I have "consciousness", but this doesn't necessarily entail the same set of properteies you expect. I am totally behind the idea that consciousness is an informational property, but that hasn't been the impression I've gotten from your posts.
      - monktastic1 9y ago
        But seeming to seem is a form of seeming. And the only form of illusion I know of requires seeming: things seem one way but are actually another. I simply do not understand what it means to doubt or deny that it seems like something is happening (though it's perfectly clear to me what it means to doubt that something is actually happening). When I see (and even accept) a proof of it, will I say "well it sure seems like something is happening, but I'm wrong, so it doesn't really seem like anything is happening?" Perhaps my imagination is limited. I thank you for trying!

mannykannot 9y ago

Let's take another look at the statement that introduced that phrase: "Consciousness is entirely subjective. There is no objective element to it." This is typical of a certain sort of internet comment, the incomplete argument. Here, the first sentence is presented as if a self-evident truth, and the second as if it inarguably follows from the first, but collyw omitted to state what he meant by "entirely subjective" and "objective element", let alone present any argument for his two assertions. Despite that, my impression is that collw is trying to suggest (perhaps without committing to an argument that could be challenged) that the claimed total subjectivity of consciousness excludes it from having any objective aspect. This, of course, is the form of qualia-based arguments for dualism / against strong AI, where the specific objective aspect they allegedly rule out is that consciousness could arise from physical processes. My only point here is that the argument "subjective implies not objective" is not axiomatic, and anyone advancing that argument has an obligation to justify the mutual exclusion, for whatever specific definition of 'subjective' and 'objective' they are using (they also, of course, have to justify that their definitions of subjective and objective are accurate characterizations of the specific things they are talking about.) I am not sure that your second question accurately represents naasking's views, but I will say that while things like mood changes and drugs raise questions as to how well I know even my own consciousness, I don't really question that there is something there (I will get to the 'really' bit presently.) That self-knowledge on my part does not, however, extend to your consciousness (or anyone else's.) It has belatedly occurred to me that you are trying to draw a line between everyone's consciousness, as being something that you say certainly exists, and everything else, that might not "really" exist. If so, then you cannot do it: any argument that distinguishes knowledge of the external world from your self-knowledge of your own consciousness puts other people's consciousness on a par with the rest of the external world. As far as I can tell, that makes the position indistinguishable from solipsism. My take on solipsism is that you cannot prove or disprove it: it stands as a demonstration of the limits of reason, and for all practical purposes, you have to take the methodological assumption that it is false simply in order for the conversation to continue - anything we conclude is, at best, only true up to solipsism (or up to being in a simulation, which I think we both agree is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to solipsism in this regard.) This, by the way, is why I included 'really' in "I don't really question that there is something there."