5 ms·

Well, it's related to solipsism in that (a) if solipsism is true, then any objective explanation is illusory, and (b) it is impossible (not just hard) to know w

Well, it's related to solipsism in that (a) if solipsism is true, then any objective explanation is illusory, and (b) it is impossible (not just hard) to know whether solipsism is true. Or instead of solipsism, you could substitute a simulation hypothesis. This is what differentiates consciousness from all other phenomena. Gravity may or may not "really" exist; all I seek to explain is why objects appear to attract. On the other hand, consciousness certainly exists (you can test this out by trying to doubt it, in which case you'll have a conscious experience of doubt), and the only phenomena I can explain it with are objective and thus may themselves not really exist.

mannykannot 9y ago
Your use of "may" in the last sentence indicates that it does not refute naaskings claim that collyw's assertion that "There is no objective element to [consciousness]" is conjecture. We can also note that your argument that "consciousness certainly exists" (which actually only applies to my consciousness) does not validate any particular belief about it.
- monktastic1 9y ago
  What does it mean for there to be an objective "element" to subjectivity (which here I take to be synonymous with consciousness)? And do you agree with naasking's claim above that it is meaningful to refute your own consciousness?
  - naasking 9y ago
    Quantum physics tells me cars don't really exist, they're just one more aggregate of matter really no different than any other aggregate. But when you say "consciousness exists", you mean something different than when you say "cars exist". We both know cars don't really exist, fundamentally, but if you believe in irreducible subjectivity then you believe that consciousness fundamentally exists in the same way that quarks and fields exist. So I do walk around and claim to be conscious just like I walk around and talk about the drive to work every morning, but I always know in the back of my mind that these are merely convenient labels, not things that actually exist. They are merely shorthands for a very complicated description of objective reality.
    - monktastic1 9y ago
      I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that very property by which I experience inference (among myriad other things). I do not have to (indeed, cannot) infer it. Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness. If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.
      - naasking 9y ago
        I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers). Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?
        monktastic1 9y ago
        It is not that I think consciousness is required for inference, but that my own process of inference takes place in/via what I'm calling consciousness, and I'm guessing (but cannot be sure that) the same is happening for you. This is why I ask: does it seem to you that anything at all is happening? Your answer cannot tell me whether you are conscious (or a p-zombie who is lying), but it may help you see what I'm getting at. If you ask me to be more precise (about "seem" or "happening"), I cannot. I can only trust that you are able to understand me. If it does seem that something is happening, that is consciousness. If you answer that it's an illusion, and it may not really seem, but only seem to seem, that's still good enough. So I can't tell you "how" I can be certain that something seems to be happening, and I cannot prove it to anybody else, but it certainly does seem.
  - mannykannot 9y ago
    Let's take another look at the statement that introduced that phrase: "Consciousness is entirely subjective. There is no objective element to it." This is typical of a certain sort of internet comment, the incomplete argument. Here, the first sentence is presented as if a self-evident truth, and the second as if it inarguably follows from the first, but collyw omitted to state what he meant by "entirely subjective" and "objective element", let alone present any argument for his two assertions. Despite that, my impression is that collw is trying to suggest (perhaps without committing to an argument that could be challenged) that the claimed total subjectivity of consciousness excludes it from having any objective aspect. This, of course, is the form of qualia-based arguments for dualism / against strong AI, where the specific objective aspect they allegedly rule out is that consciousness could arise from physical processes. My only point here is that the argument "subjective implies not objective" is not axiomatic, and anyone advancing that argument has an obligation to justify the mutual exclusion, for whatever specific definition of 'subjective' and 'objective' they are using (they also, of course, have to justify that their definitions of subjective and objective are accurate characterizations of the specific things they are talking about.) I am not sure that your second question accurately represents naasking's views, but I will say that while things like mood changes and drugs raise questions as to how well I know even my own consciousness, I don't really question that there is something there (I will get to the 'really' bit presently.) That self-knowledge on my part does not, however, extend to your consciousness (or anyone else's.) It has belatedly occurred to me that you are trying to draw a line between everyone's consciousness, as being something that you say certainly exists, and everything else, that might not "really" exist. If so, then you cannot do it: any argument that distinguishes knowledge of the external world from your self-knowledge of your own consciousness puts other people's consciousness on a par with the rest of the external world. As far as I can tell, that makes the position indistinguishable from solipsism. My take on solipsism is that you cannot prove or disprove it: it stands as a demonstration of the limits of reason, and for all practical purposes, you have to take the methodological assumption that it is false simply in order for the conversation to continue - anything we conclude is, at best, only true up to solipsism (or up to being in a simulation, which I think we both agree is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to solipsism in this regard.) This, by the way, is why I included 'really' in "I don't really question that there is something there."

mannykannot 9y ago

Your use of "may" in the last sentence indicates that it does not refute naaskings claim that collyw's assertion that "There is no objective element to [consciousness]" is conjecture. We can also note that your argument that "consciousness certainly exists" (which actually only applies to my consciousness) does not validate any particular belief about it.

monktastic1 9y ago
What does it mean for there to be an objective "element" to subjectivity (which here I take to be synonymous with consciousness)? And do you agree with naasking's claim above that it is meaningful to refute your own consciousness?
- naasking 9y ago
  Quantum physics tells me cars don't really exist, they're just one more aggregate of matter really no different than any other aggregate. But when you say "consciousness exists", you mean something different than when you say "cars exist". We both know cars don't really exist, fundamentally, but if you believe in irreducible subjectivity then you believe that consciousness fundamentally exists in the same way that quarks and fields exist. So I do walk around and claim to be conscious just like I walk around and talk about the drive to work every morning, but I always know in the back of my mind that these are merely convenient labels, not things that actually exist. They are merely shorthands for a very complicated description of objective reality.
  - monktastic1 9y ago
    I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that very property by which I experience inference (among myriad other things). I do not have to (indeed, cannot) infer it. Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness. If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.
    - naasking 9y ago
      I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers). Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?
      - monktastic1 9y ago
        It is not that I think consciousness is required for inference, but that my own process of inference takes place in/via what I'm calling consciousness, and I'm guessing (but cannot be sure that) the same is happening for you. This is why I ask: does it seem to you that anything at all is happening? Your answer cannot tell me whether you are conscious (or a p-zombie who is lying), but it may help you see what I'm getting at. If you ask me to be more precise (about "seem" or "happening"), I cannot. I can only trust that you are able to understand me. If it does seem that something is happening, that is consciousness. If you answer that it's an illusion, and it may not really seem, but only seem to seem, that's still good enough. So I can't tell you "how" I can be certain that something seems to be happening, and I cannot prove it to anybody else, but it certainly does seem.
- mannykannot 9y ago
  Let's take another look at the statement that introduced that phrase: "Consciousness is entirely subjective. There is no objective element to it." This is typical of a certain sort of internet comment, the incomplete argument. Here, the first sentence is presented as if a self-evident truth, and the second as if it inarguably follows from the first, but collyw omitted to state what he meant by "entirely subjective" and "objective element", let alone present any argument for his two assertions. Despite that, my impression is that collw is trying to suggest (perhaps without committing to an argument that could be challenged) that the claimed total subjectivity of consciousness excludes it from having any objective aspect. This, of course, is the form of qualia-based arguments for dualism / against strong AI, where the specific objective aspect they allegedly rule out is that consciousness could arise from physical processes. My only point here is that the argument "subjective implies not objective" is not axiomatic, and anyone advancing that argument has an obligation to justify the mutual exclusion, for whatever specific definition of 'subjective' and 'objective' they are using (they also, of course, have to justify that their definitions of subjective and objective are accurate characterizations of the specific things they are talking about.) I am not sure that your second question accurately represents naasking's views, but I will say that while things like mood changes and drugs raise questions as to how well I know even my own consciousness, I don't really question that there is something there (I will get to the 'really' bit presently.) That self-knowledge on my part does not, however, extend to your consciousness (or anyone else's.) It has belatedly occurred to me that you are trying to draw a line between everyone's consciousness, as being something that you say certainly exists, and everything else, that might not "really" exist. If so, then you cannot do it: any argument that distinguishes knowledge of the external world from your self-knowledge of your own consciousness puts other people's consciousness on a par with the rest of the external world. As far as I can tell, that makes the position indistinguishable from solipsism. My take on solipsism is that you cannot prove or disprove it: it stands as a demonstration of the limits of reason, and for all practical purposes, you have to take the methodological assumption that it is false simply in order for the conversation to continue - anything we conclude is, at best, only true up to solipsism (or up to being in a simulation, which I think we both agree is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to solipsism in this regard.) This, by the way, is why I included 'really' in "I don't really question that there is something there."