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I was responding to the above comment saying that it's a conjecture that consciousness is subjective. I'm saying it's a definition not a conjecture. That fact

I was responding to the above comment saying that it's a conjecture that consciousness is subjective. I'm saying it's a definition not a conjecture. That fact makes objective investigation very hard. If I don't know whether a person is a p-zombie, I cannot know whether any objective events cause his consciousness. And if it's my consciousness we're talking about, I cannot be there to investigate the objective causes of it.

mannykannot 9y ago
I believe the conjecture lies in the claim that there is no objective element to it. The fact that objective investigation is difficult does not make the case. BTW, your specific arguments for it being hard seem to me to border on solipsism.
- monktastic1 9y ago
  Well, it's related to solipsism in that (a) if solipsism is true, then any objective explanation is illusory, and (b) it is impossible (not just hard) to know whether solipsism is true. Or instead of solipsism, you could substitute a simulation hypothesis. This is what differentiates consciousness from all other phenomena. Gravity may or may not "really" exist; all I seek to explain is why objects appear to attract. On the other hand, consciousness certainly exists (you can test this out by trying to doubt it, in which case you'll have a conscious experience of doubt), and the only phenomena I can explain it with are objective and thus may themselves not really exist.
  - mannykannot 9y ago
    Your use of "may" in the last sentence indicates that it does not refute naaskings claim that collyw's assertion that "There is no objective element to [consciousness]" is conjecture. We can also note that your argument that "consciousness certainly exists" (which actually only applies to my consciousness) does not validate any particular belief about it.
    - monktastic1 9y ago
      What does it mean for there to be an objective "element" to subjectivity (which here I take to be synonymous with consciousness)? And do you agree with naasking's claim above that it is meaningful to refute your own consciousness?
      - naasking 9y ago
        Quantum physics tells me cars don't really exist, they're just one more aggregate of matter really no different than any other aggregate. But when you say "consciousness exists", you mean something different than when you say "cars exist". We both know cars don't really exist, fundamentally, but if you believe in irreducible subjectivity then you believe that consciousness fundamentally exists in the same way that quarks and fields exist. So I do walk around and claim to be conscious just like I walk around and talk about the drive to work every morning, but I always know in the back of my mind that these are merely convenient labels, not things that actually exist. They are merely shorthands for a very complicated description of objective reality.
        monktastic1 9y ago
        I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that very property by which I experience inference (among myriad other things). I do not have to (indeed, cannot) infer it. Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness. If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.
        naasking 9y ago
        I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers). Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?

mannykannot 9y ago

I believe the conjecture lies in the claim that there is no objective element to it. The fact that objective investigation is difficult does not make the case. BTW, your specific arguments for it being hard seem to me to border on solipsism.

monktastic1 9y ago
Well, it's related to solipsism in that (a) if solipsism is true, then any objective explanation is illusory, and (b) it is impossible (not just hard) to know whether solipsism is true. Or instead of solipsism, you could substitute a simulation hypothesis. This is what differentiates consciousness from all other phenomena. Gravity may or may not "really" exist; all I seek to explain is why objects appear to attract. On the other hand, consciousness certainly exists (you can test this out by trying to doubt it, in which case you'll have a conscious experience of doubt), and the only phenomena I can explain it with are objective and thus may themselves not really exist.
- mannykannot 9y ago
  Your use of "may" in the last sentence indicates that it does not refute naaskings claim that collyw's assertion that "There is no objective element to [consciousness]" is conjecture. We can also note that your argument that "consciousness certainly exists" (which actually only applies to my consciousness) does not validate any particular belief about it.
  - monktastic1 9y ago
    What does it mean for there to be an objective "element" to subjectivity (which here I take to be synonymous with consciousness)? And do you agree with naasking's claim above that it is meaningful to refute your own consciousness?
    - naasking 9y ago
      Quantum physics tells me cars don't really exist, they're just one more aggregate of matter really no different than any other aggregate. But when you say "consciousness exists", you mean something different than when you say "cars exist". We both know cars don't really exist, fundamentally, but if you believe in irreducible subjectivity then you believe that consciousness fundamentally exists in the same way that quarks and fields exist. So I do walk around and claim to be conscious just like I walk around and talk about the drive to work every morning, but I always know in the back of my mind that these are merely convenient labels, not things that actually exist. They are merely shorthands for a very complicated description of objective reality.
      - monktastic1 9y ago
        I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that very property by which I experience inference (among myriad other things). I do not have to (indeed, cannot) infer it. Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness. If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.
        naasking 9y ago
        I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers). Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?