3 ms·
Easier: register with an SMS-enabled VoIP provider, like Twilio or voip.ms, and use said virtual SMS number as your 2FA. Rather hard to steal. You can then set
by derefr 10y ago
Easier: register with an SMS-enabled VoIP provider, like Twilio or voip.ms, and use said virtual SMS number as your 2FA. Rather hard to steal.
You can then set the service up to forward received SMS messages to your regular SMS number—but, if your phone is compromised/stolen, you can go back to the account and immediately turn off this forwarding.
---
Sadly, this approach reduces the security back to single-factor, since you get into the SMS account with something you know, rather than something you have.
You can at least treat the VoIP account like a password-manager: give it a long, unforgiving "master password." (Or a random password that's stored in a password-manager, if you use one.)
- voltagex_ 10y agoA lot of providers will block VoIP and SMS gateways being used as verification (see PayPal for an example).
- derefr 10y agoAFAIK you can get a number from a different carrier and then transfer it to the VoIP carrier. When queried, it will still show up as "owned" by the original carrier.
- toast0 10y agoIt depends on how they classify; numbers are issued in blocks of 1000, and the allocations are public knowledge, but you can also do a real time carrier lookup, which changes after porting completes.
- Nexxxeh 10y agoThere's a guy that does an SMS to web gateway with real telephony hardware. You pay by bitcoin and its accessible over TOR. You pay, he pops in a topped up PAYG SIM. You have a real mobile telephone number. You can run your own private one at home with a Raspberry Pi/ttl serial adapter and a cheap SIM module. Or use a dongle.
- thaumasiotes 10y ago> Sadly, this approach reduces the security back to single-factor, since you get into the SMS account with something you know, rather than something you have. I don't understand why Google Authenticator is supposed to be so conceptually different from a password. The codes it provides are a deterministic (and public!) function of a code shared between you and the party you're authenticating to. Or in other words, it's exactly equivalent to a password. When I set up 2FA on github, they gave me a code to put into Google Authenticator, and also a bunch of "one-time reset codes" in case I lost my phone. Why wouldn't I just record the original code in whatever place I'm supposed to store the one-time reset codes?
- spangry 10y agoI don't know how google 2FA is implemented, but I'd just assumed the initial code is akin to something like an initialisation vector / nonce for a counter or CBC mode block cipher. With the counter being 'time', meaning the scheme works something like: hash_fn(concat(IV, time)) -> func(somehash) -> [code seq. 1] Then on the next round the IV is discarded and it becomes: hash_fn(concat([code seq. 1], time)) -> func(somehash) -> [code seq. 2] That's almost certainly an over-simplification / wrong; it doesn't seem very secure to just use the previous output as the IV for the next round. Maybe it chains all previous outputs together somehow, IDK. I should probably research this, given how much I rely on 2FA for security. EDIT: The Wikipedia article on TOTP seems to suggest that you're right; the initial shared secret looks indistinguishable from a password (although the article is a bit vague): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-based_One-time_Password_Algorithm#Weaknesses_and_vulnerabilities https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-based_One-time_Password_A...
- acdha 10y agoThe differences from a password: 1. Not shared across sites 2. Guaranteed minimum length 3. The portion going over the wire cannot be used more than once or after a few seconds 4. The phone app doesn't expose the seed or allow you to copy it off the device. Running on iOS has strong guarantees against access by other apps. That's not perfect and U2F is a huge improvement but it's safer than SMS and given the number of google users who get attacked daily a reasonable incremental improvement.