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> Hyper-determinism How does "hyper-determinism" differ from "determinism"? I find that when people use adjectives like "hyper" or "ultra" for some theoretica

> Hyper-determinism How does "hyper-determinism" differ from "determinism"? I find that when people use adjectives like "hyper" or "ultra" for some theoretical view (like people who talk about 'ultra-darwinism') they are trying to make something appear "extreme" without making any real argument for that position. > You end up going into hyper-determinism, which is almost all about negating free will. That phrasing implies that people come up with, or want, "hyper-deterministic" views because they want to negate the idea of free will. Is that what you mean? If not, what are you trying to say?

rtpg 10y ago
Sorry, this might be the wrong term for a higher level concept based on determinism. If everything is deterministic, then our actions can theoretically be pre-determined. I've seen discussion around pilot wave theory that goes into details about this thought process. This is fine and good. But if I publish "A solution to the double slit experiment" and the contents are "everything is deterministic, therefore all the protons go where they go" (hidden behind a pilot wave and initial values), that's not really the right genre of paper is it? It's not that I'm demeaning it, but that I don't feel like it's in the same realm of discussion os the Copenhagen's rather pragmatic "stuff happens behind the curtain, but here's how to work with it" approach.
- naasking 10y ago
  > It's not that I'm demeaning it, but that I don't feel like it's in the same realm of discussion os the Copenhagen's rather pragmatic "stuff happens behind the curtain, but here's how to work with it" approach. I don't get the distinction you're trying to make. The maths are all the same, so the interpretation has almost no bearing on how to work with it. Furthermore, pilot waves produce a deterministic theory because of non-locality, but it sounds like you're criticizing superdeterminism. They're not the same. 't Hooft is working on a superdeterministic theory based on cellular automata. In any case, how are pilot waves any different than any other classical theory in this regard? It's about describing the system as accurately as one can, which entails inferring the initial conditions based on how we know the system evolves, ie. this cannon ball fell here because it was launched with force X at angle Y from height Z.
eli_gottlieb 10y ago
>How does "hyper-determinism" differ from "determinism"? It's the difference between a trajectory that looks like Brownian motion consisting of a preprogrammed constant function, versus actually being sampled from a Wiener Process. In the former case, if you know the function, you can predict the trajectory with total certainty. In the latter case, if you use the Wiener Process as a model, you can predict the trajectory probabilistically.
- jamesrcole 10y ago
  I'm not familiar with those concepts (like Wiener Process), but I don't think notions of predictability should be mixed up with notions of determinism. Whether something is predictable or not does not change how deterministic it is.
  - eli_gottlieb 10y ago
    I think what I have to say, then, is welcome to quantum mechanics. Or, in fact, welcome to probability theory. Mathematically, there's no difference between a process which can only be predicted probabilistically, and a process which really is random; no difference between incomplete knowledge in your head and stochasticity in the world. An interesting question is: how could a fully deterministic ontology give rise to beings capable of having probabilistic beliefs? Worse, how can a fully deterministic ontology give rise to truly random mathematical entities like Chaitin's Omega? In fact, in such a universe, where do the bits for atomic random-number generators come from? After all, if they're not really random, there should be some deterministic model capable of predicting them, and yet, quantum mechanics tells us precisely that such a thing is impossible. You can try to have a Bayesian epistemology with a nonstochastic ontology, but it doesn't really make sense. Just let your ontology be stochastic: then and only then you can physically account for both physical randomness and probabilistic belief.
    - jamesrcole 10y ago
      > I think what I have to say, then, is welcome to quantum mechanics. Or, in fact, welcome to probability theory. Mathematically, there's no difference between a process which can only be predicted probabilistically, and a process which really is random; no difference between incomplete knowledge in your head and stochasticity in the world. I'm not talking about randomness. I'm talking about determinism, and as far as I can see what you're saying says nothing about determinism or differing degrees of determinism. > An interesting question is: how could a fully deterministic ontology give rise to beings capable of having probabilistic beliefs? I don't see that as a problem at all. It fits completely fine with the idea that probability is a matter of lack of knowledge. > Worse, how can a fully deterministic ontology give rise to truly random mathematical entities like Chaitin's Omega? In fact, in such a universe, where do the bits for atomic random-number generators come from? After all, if they're not really random, there should be some deterministic model capable of predicting them, and yet, quantum mechanics tells us precisely that such a thing is impossible. You're talking like it's already a settled matter as to whether reality is fundamentally deterministic or not. Are you saying that there's definitive proof that deterministic accounts of QM are incorrect?

rtpg 10y ago

Sorry, this might be the wrong term for a higher level concept based on determinism. If everything is deterministic, then our actions can theoretically be pre-determined. I've seen discussion around pilot wave theory that goes into details about this thought process. This is fine and good. But if I publish "A solution to the double slit experiment" and the contents are "everything is deterministic, therefore all the protons go where they go" (hidden behind a pilot wave and initial values), that's not really the right genre of paper is it? It's not that I'm demeaning it, but that I don't feel like it's in the same realm of discussion os the Copenhagen's rather pragmatic "stuff happens behind the curtain, but here's how to work with it" approach.

naasking 10y ago
> It's not that I'm demeaning it, but that I don't feel like it's in the same realm of discussion os the Copenhagen's rather pragmatic "stuff happens behind the curtain, but here's how to work with it" approach. I don't get the distinction you're trying to make. The maths are all the same, so the interpretation has almost no bearing on how to work with it. Furthermore, pilot waves produce a deterministic theory because of non-locality, but it sounds like you're criticizing superdeterminism. They're not the same. 't Hooft is working on a superdeterministic theory based on cellular automata. In any case, how are pilot waves any different than any other classical theory in this regard? It's about describing the system as accurately as one can, which entails inferring the initial conditions based on how we know the system evolves, ie. this cannon ball fell here because it was launched with force X at angle Y from height Z.

eli_gottlieb 10y ago

>How does "hyper-determinism" differ from "determinism"? It's the difference between a trajectory that looks like Brownian motion consisting of a preprogrammed constant function, versus actually being sampled from a Wiener Process. In the former case, if you know the function, you can predict the trajectory with total certainty. In the latter case, if you use the Wiener Process as a model, you can predict the trajectory probabilistically.

jamesrcole 10y ago
I'm not familiar with those concepts (like Wiener Process), but I don't think notions of predictability should be mixed up with notions of determinism. Whether something is predictable or not does not change how deterministic it is.
- eli_gottlieb 10y ago
  I think what I have to say, then, is welcome to quantum mechanics. Or, in fact, welcome to probability theory. Mathematically, there's no difference between a process which can only be predicted probabilistically, and a process which really is random; no difference between incomplete knowledge in your head and stochasticity in the world. An interesting question is: how could a fully deterministic ontology give rise to beings capable of having probabilistic beliefs? Worse, how can a fully deterministic ontology give rise to truly random mathematical entities like Chaitin's Omega? In fact, in such a universe, where do the bits for atomic random-number generators come from? After all, if they're not really random, there should be some deterministic model capable of predicting them, and yet, quantum mechanics tells us precisely that such a thing is impossible. You can try to have a Bayesian epistemology with a nonstochastic ontology, but it doesn't really make sense. Just let your ontology be stochastic: then and only then you can physically account for both physical randomness and probabilistic belief.
  - jamesrcole 10y ago
    > I think what I have to say, then, is welcome to quantum mechanics. Or, in fact, welcome to probability theory. Mathematically, there's no difference between a process which can only be predicted probabilistically, and a process which really is random; no difference between incomplete knowledge in your head and stochasticity in the world. I'm not talking about randomness. I'm talking about determinism, and as far as I can see what you're saying says nothing about determinism or differing degrees of determinism. > An interesting question is: how could a fully deterministic ontology give rise to beings capable of having probabilistic beliefs? I don't see that as a problem at all. It fits completely fine with the idea that probability is a matter of lack of knowledge. > Worse, how can a fully deterministic ontology give rise to truly random mathematical entities like Chaitin's Omega? In fact, in such a universe, where do the bits for atomic random-number generators come from? After all, if they're not really random, there should be some deterministic model capable of predicting them, and yet, quantum mechanics tells us precisely that such a thing is impossible. You're talking like it's already a settled matter as to whether reality is fundamentally deterministic or not. Are you saying that there's definitive proof that deterministic accounts of QM are incorrect?