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Brian from Backblaze here. > It doesn't provide an additional layer of security to use asymmetric crypto the way they are using it. I disagree. Here are some
by brianwski 9y ago
Brian from Backblaze here.
> It doesn't provide an additional layer of security to use asymmetric crypto the way they are using it.
I disagree. Here are some examples of where I think it has been useful to us (and our customers):
1) Backblaze encrypts the data with pub/priv keys and then sends the completely encrypted data over HTTPS. When OpenSSL had the Heartbleed bug, the HTTPS was not enough, and our encryption kept us safer for the few days until we had everything patched and fixed. So from time to time when SSL/HTTPS has zero day vulnerabilities, the extra layer of encryption helps.
2) If you set a private passphrase, it is literally a zero knowledge system until the first time you ever request a restore. Let's say you don't need a restore for two years. If a hacker penetrates our systems at any time during that two years, your backup is completely impossible to read, because you literally have never supplied the private pass phrase. Ok, so then after two years let's say you need one of your files back. At this point you hand us the private passphrase (which we do NOT write to a disk, it is stored in RAM only). Yes, at this moment there is a short window (maybe 60 seconds long) of decreased security until your backup is prepared and when you download it. Then we delete the plain text version of your files (all completely automated on a secure computer in our datacenter) and we purge the passphrase from RAM. Then after that window if at any point AFTER that our systems are compromised then you are totally safe because the hacker cannot roll back time and gain access to the past. Is this perfect? No. But 60 seconds of slightly decreased security on one computer in our datacenter is better than leaving your files laying around in original unencrypted form in our data center for YEARS.
- zeroer 9y agoHi Brian, I'm a happy Backblaze customer. Thanks for commenting. What you're describing is certainly better than no encryption, but couldn't the system be designed so that unencrypted customer data is never accessible by Backblaze? That the decryption occurs only when a user enters the password locally?