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Having read a lot of books on the lead-up to WWI, and a few more on the conduct of WWI myself, I must say that the entire thesis comes across as rather forced.
by jcranmer 10y ago
Having read a lot of books on the lead-up to WWI, and a few more on the conduct of WWI myself, I must say that the entire thesis comes across as rather forced.
First off, it's rather well-known that Germany's fear of a two-front war and encirclement led to much of its preliminary war plan. On the other hand, the circumstances that led up to such a scenario were not preordained from its construction. It was largely a result of the early 20th century Germany managing to piss off just about everybody else with amazingly inept foreign diplomacy. In particular, Germany decided to give up its relationship with Russia, which France eagerly took advantage of and bound the two countries fairly close together. Germany's naval race with Britain also did much to antagonize it for no real gain.
Also, Alsace-Lorraine is much oversold as a cause of war. It's true that France did want Alsace-Lorraine back. But many in France were not prepared to go to war to actually achieve that aim. Instead, the situation in France post-Franco-Prussian War was to try to find allies that could help divert German attention, and their allies were the Russians who needed lots of help to even minimally qualify for that role and the British who went to rather great lengths to try to avoid actually fulfilling their commitment when August 1914 came around (Germany marching through Belgium gave Britain the political cover to actually commit).
As for whether or not Germany could win, that's a difficult what-if to answer. The Schlieffen Plan was, in the abstract, a masterpiece of precision planning and timetabling. But the plan also had very little room for change if things didn't work out. Belgium put up an unexpectedly fierce resistance, Austria-Hungary had a surprisingly hard time in Serbia, and Russia was doing better at first than Germany expected. In the end, the German momentum and logistics chain was incapable of carrying them to Paris, which completely ruined their plans and any hope of a quick end to the war. And Germany was completely unprepared for that scenario (to be fair, no one else was).
- rustynails 10y agoYour version is a somewhat closer reflection of the version of what is taught in school today (ie. there is no magical 1869). However, the actual conflict was sparked over Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand's assassination. You excluded some fundamental points that help understand a much broader series of issues (namely, a very late unification of Germany causing upset in many alliances, region-wide instability beyond Germany and a crumbling Austro-Hungarian empire desperate to cling to power). As an example, read Aethelric's post here as it is important in explaining the seeds that set Germany as it was in 1869. https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1v3vk8/why_did_germany_and_italy_unite_so_late_compared/ https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1v3vk8/why_d... The region we now know as Germany was a series of small towns with mostly independent rule. With instability (especially crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), Germany established formal alliances quickly as the political climate grew in intensity. Franz Ferdinand was shot, the European states fought and the US (with late entry) injected fresh ideas, troops and supplies, which decisively turned the tides of a messy war. So, 1869 was more like a traffic light that triggered the car crash. Without understanding the history, you can't really understand each participant's trajectories or motives. To limit the answer to "1869" is only slightly more informative than limiting the answer to "Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand's assassination".
- mirimir 10y agoI gather that your account has been zombied.
- zeteo 10y agoCorrect, if Germany had continued Bismarck's foreign policy [1] then the next war (if it came) would have looked very different. Antagonizing Russia in the Balkans, France in Morocco, and Britain on the high seas were rather gratuitous moves between 1900 - 1914, driven by Wilhelm II's personality more than by any geopolitical factors. It's amazing how much hubris it took to sink the Second Reich. As far as I can tell, Germany was on track to win the war as late as spring 1917. They had the resources and the right strategy: defensive in the West (retreat to the Hindenburg Line) and offensive in the East. The last crucial mistake was resuming unrestricted submarine warfare at the same time. This predictably drew the US into the war. By summer 1918, the benefits of defeating Russia and Romania in the East were nullified by American troops pouring in at a rate of 10,000 a day, and the war's outcome was pretty much sealed. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinsurance_Treaty https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinsurance_Treaty
- D-Coder 10y agoI saw on an AHC program the German calculation about unrestricted sub warfare: that they could choke Britain in six months, but it would take the US two years to ramp up a real fighting force. So it made good sense, but a miscalculation in a different way.
- zeteo 10y agoIt was a severe miscalculation. First, Germany already had a strategy to win the war - beat Russia first - and any attempt to knock out Britain at the cost of involving the US was a major distraction. Second, even if US troops took longer to arrive, the US Navy was ready to help defeat the submarine campaign right away [1]. [1] https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/baylys-navy.html https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading...
- woodandsteel 10y ago>As far as I can tell, Germany was on track to win the war as late as spring 1917. So did this fact provide the ground for the belief, which helped lay the groundwork for the success of the Nazi movement, that Germany had lost the war because it had been betrayed by its leadership?