> backdoor A backdoor is far too obvious for widespread use, which is the needed anyway. The NSA (and FVEY in general) instead spends a lot of money on program

> backdoor A backdoor is far too obvious for widespread use, which is the needed anyway. The NSA (and FVEY in general) instead spends a lot of money on programs like BULLRUN (Edgehill at GCHQ) that try to bypass the need for backdoors and weaken encryption. PSYOPS for nerds[1] is much cheaper and easier than direct backdoors or other technical methods. Instead of a backdoor we have IPSEC standards that is overly complicated, had to implement, and mandated "null" encryption support[2]. Most communication channels remain in plaintext or encrypted with keys that are recoverable, too short, or easily MitMed. [1] https://archive.fosdem.org/2014/schedule/event/nsa_operation_orchestra/ https://archive.fosdem.org/2014/schedule/event/nsa_operation... [2] http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12325.html http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg123...