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It could be necessary for NSA to rely on zero days or implanted bugs. Any entry point must be possible to close quickly, as soon as the enemy discovers it. Cre
by draugadrotten 10y ago
It could be necessary for NSA to rely on zero days or implanted bugs. Any entry point must be possible to close quickly, as soon as the enemy discovers it. Creating what you call structural back doors would make it possible for the enemy to use the same structural back door.
Along these lines, I would expect the NSA to encourage the use of cryptography and encrypted software/Secure Boot/secure communications while they ensure the NSA have a set of extra keys and can sign software at will.
- cm2187 10y agoYou can use public-private key cryptography that the enemy cannot compromise unless they compromise the NSA (the private keys).
- draugadrotten 10y agoWell, there are known stories of "accidental" key leaks: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/08/microsoft_accid.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/08/microsoft_acc...
- deno 10y agoThat would still stand out as a sore thumb. Deliberate introduction of hard to exploit 0days would be precisely how they would do it. All you need is one plant with commit access.
- Cyph0n 10y agoPublic key crypto can be broken if the certificate isn't securely pinned on the client. In other words, the adversary could insert their own cert and replicate the exploit.
- aub3bhat 10y agoWait what? Cert pinning is not required for RSA pkcs.