3 ms·
> The exception added for computer programs arose from this case, but did not address the RAM copy doctrine. It makes an explicit exemption for "(c)Machine Main
by tzs 10y ago
> The exception added for computer programs arose from this case, but did not address the RAM copy doctrine. It makes an explicit exemption for "(c)Machine Maintenance or Repair." only. If you're not maintaining or repairing your friend's machine, but you still load up a game he's installed, you've technically made an infringing copy, just as this computer tech had, because you are not doing it for "maintenance or repair".
This should fall under 17 USC 101(a)(1), "Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy".
> Another contrived example under RAM copy doctrine: if you've downloaded a song illegally, you are not on the hook for only the copy on your hard disk, but the number of plays, since each one is a distinct infringing copy created by your computer loading the music into its memory repeatedly.
When a plaintiff sues for copyright infringement and wins, he can ask for actual damages plus the infringer's profits (17 USC 504(b)), or he can ask for statutory damages (17 USC 504(c)).
If he asks for actual damages and profits, then the number of times the song was played will only be relevant if somehow the more it was played the more it caused actual damage to the plaintiff or if the downloader was doing something that made money from playing the song repeatedly.
If he asks for statutory damages, they are awarded per work infringed, not per infringing copy. The number of times the copy was actually played would probably only have an affect on the outcome if the defendant was trying to argue that they had not intentionally downloaded the song. (The "a virus must have downloaded it!" or "it must have been one of my kids!" approach is popular).
- cookiecaper 10y ago>This should fall under 17 USC [117](a)(1), "Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy". It says that the owner may "make or authorize the making of" a copy for this purpose. This means that whether or not the copy is infringing will hinge on the language of the authorization granted by the owner. It's noteworthy that despite the language of "...or authorize the making of..." being in place prior to MAI v. Peak, the Peak technicians were not considered sufficiently "authorized" to make a copy by running a program that the computer's owners had purchased, even though doing so was a necessary component in fulfilling their duties. One would think that logically, the owner's authorization to make the copy would've applied. Going back to the decision to see the reasoning on this, I find nothing specific discussing why the authorization from the software's owners would not have applied. [0] There is some commentary about how in a prior case, copying the program onto "silicon chips", meaning the fixed medium of a diskette (non-floppy), was ruled infringement because it was "not an essential step" in using the software, since it could be used by copying it only into RAM. Since the software could be used from RAM after being read from disk, it was "fixed" copy under the statute. That's all well and good (not really, but discussed above), but it doesn't say why the authorization of the owners of MAI software was insufficient to allow the computer technician to make copies as his/her agent, necessitating the addition of subsections (c) and (d) in 1998. [0] https://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/991_F2d_511.htm#[fn5]00 https://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/991_F2d_511.htm#...
- tzs 10y ago> It says that the owner may "make or authorize the making of" a copy for this purpose. This means that whether or not the copy is infringing will hinge on the language of the authorization granted by the owner. It says "owner of a copy". That's referring to the person who owns the particular copy of the program installed on the machine, not to the owner of the copyright.
- cookiecaper 10y agoYeah, I know. That's what I'm referring to. Peak was shut down for copyright infringement, despite being authorized to use MAI software by owners of the copy of that software, their clients, who would have granted "authorization", and despite the statute's statement that owners of a copy can authorize the making of additional copies insofar as it's an essential step in the use of the program. Why would this authorization of the copy's owner not cover Peak's use of the software?