3 ms·

That would be a regulator or Congress. The airline would set no cap, if they could get away with macing you to get you off the airplane, they would. "Next time,

by cmurf 10y ago

That would be a regulator or Congress. The airline would set no cap, if they could get away with macing you to get you off the airplane, they would. "Next time, just get off the plane when we ask the first time." When a family member, or associate of Congress gets hit with this experience, then maybe the fines get adjusted accordingly. Anyway, hopefully the guy gets a good lawyer.

justin66 10y ago
> That would be a regulator or Congress. No, it's a United policy: https://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/contract-of-carriage.aspx#sec25 https://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/contract-of-carriag... The airline hasn't commented yet on why they didn't go above 800, when they could go to 1350.
- cmurf 10y ago
  Maybe I'm thinking of baggage. I know there's a limit on liability applied by law somewhere.
- phil21 10y ago
  That's just IDB coverage, mandated by the FAA. They don't get a choice here. You will find the exact same penalties and limits for all airlines. Voluntary compensation is entirely different - they are free to offer whatever they like to get someone off the flight. Involuntary unfortunately incentives keeping those limits low as a matter of airline policy though, of course. They can force someone off a plane for usually far less than $800 if they feel like taking a customer good will hit. This ORD-SDF flight certainly was nowhere near $1350 in IDB comp - likely less than $300 in mandatory IDB comp based on average ticket prices. I've seen these offers go as high as $2,000 during significant service disruptions on major airlines. This is a corporate policy failure, as I'm sure the gate agent was only allowed to authorize up to $800 for that flight or something dumb. They rolled the dice on saving a few hundred bucks against their reputation this time. I think it's safe to say they lost badly on that calculation.
  - kchoudhu 10y ago
    You're assuming that low level airline employees even realized they were rolling dice. They were told to save cash, and by golly, they saved that cash.
- huac 10y ago
  No, that's US law: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/250.5 https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/250.5

by cmurf 10y ago

justin66 10y ago

> That would be a regulator or Congress. No, it's a United policy: https://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/contract-of-carriage.aspx#sec25 https://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/contract-of-carriag... The airline hasn't commented yet on why they didn't go above 800, when they could go to 1350.

cmurf 10y ago
Maybe I'm thinking of baggage. I know there's a limit on liability applied by law somewhere.
phil21 10y ago
That's just IDB coverage, mandated by the FAA. They don't get a choice here. You will find the exact same penalties and limits for all airlines. Voluntary compensation is entirely different - they are free to offer whatever they like to get someone off the flight. Involuntary unfortunately incentives keeping those limits low as a matter of airline policy though, of course. They can force someone off a plane for usually far less than $800 if they feel like taking a customer good will hit. This ORD-SDF flight certainly was nowhere near $1350 in IDB comp - likely less than $300 in mandatory IDB comp based on average ticket prices. I've seen these offers go as high as $2,000 during significant service disruptions on major airlines. This is a corporate policy failure, as I'm sure the gate agent was only allowed to authorize up to $800 for that flight or something dumb. They rolled the dice on saving a few hundred bucks against their reputation this time. I think it's safe to say they lost badly on that calculation.
- kchoudhu 10y ago
  You're assuming that low level airline employees even realized they were rolling dice. They were told to save cash, and by golly, they saved that cash.
huac 10y ago
No, that's US law: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/250.5 https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/250.5