4 ms·
You have it backwards. The point of this is so that a CA does not issue a certificate to someone who does not have control of your DNS records. It's a fail safe
by koolba 10y ago
You have it backwards. The point of this is so that a CA does not issue a certificate to someone who does not have control of your DNS records. It's a fail safe.
Plus combining this with Certificate Transparency should allow for handling this in an automated fashion. A third party can validate CAs to ensure compliance.
- michaelt 10y agoA third party can validate CAs to ensure compliance. Domain owners can remove or change the CAA record after the certificate has been issued - so any third parties performing checking will have to be quick about it :)
- koolba 10y agoWell you would want it to be quick anyway right? I don't want to know about a shady cert issuance next month, I'd want to know now!
- okket 10y agoWhy would they? The idea of CAA is to help the domain owner, to prevent malicious issued certificates, to have a documented, open, visible way do identify which CA is authorised to issue a certificate. So, if you doubt what you see is legitimate, you have a way to check (also, when combined with DNSSEC, it is quite hard to forge/spoof). Even without DNSSEC, every little bit of additional validation counts IMHO. You could e.g. trace sudden changes in CAA records and get very suspicious...
- tptacek 10y agoIt's quite hard to forge or spoof to anyone except: * The world governments that control the TLDs and can thus override DNSSEC policy by fiat. * Any attacker between the CA's resolver and the DNS server, since DNSSEC only protects transations between DNS servers, not between clients and servers.
- mnordhoff 10y agoI would hope CAs run their own DNSSEC validating resolvers, and they don't just plug "nameserver 8.8.8.8" into resolv.conf.