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Materialism alone cannot explain the riddle of consciousness
- dkarapetyan 10y agoIsn't this confusing the map for the terrain? The mathematical formalism doesn't have an answer to the questions this essay is asking. If you model reality with wave functions and compute then you get certain results. That's pretty much all the mathematics says. Material things are entirely absent in the mathematical formalism. In math people learn to not ask questions like "what is a set?". The answer is always whatever is consistent with the axioms of set theory. That question is a non-question in the mathematical formalism of set theory. I think it's the same thing in physics. Asking what is an electron when all you have are some axioms about wave functions will lead to equally nonsensical answers.
- malloryerik 10y agoIt sounds like you may actually be in accord with the author. His point seems to be a reminder that, as I think you are in part saying, mathematical formalism -- and physics -- don't have answers to many fundamental questions, yet it is tempting and can even appear more "serious" to jump to conclusions, especially when jumping to another field, and act as if they do. "Classifying consciousness as a material problem is tantamount to saying that consciousness, too, remains fundamentally unexplained." So it appears that he's reminding us that the map is still largely blank, with only some terrain filled in. This hits my ears almost like an echo of Plato's Apology, wherein Socrates claims that if the Delphic oracle is correct and he is indeed wiser than others, it is only because he has a better grasp of his own ignorance.
- blacksqr 10y agoThe article presents no evidence to support this assertion. What aspect of the human brain transcends physical law? The author makes no attempt to say. The problem with the so-called riddle of consciousness is that you can assert to me that you experience subjectivity, but you cannot demonstrate to me that you do. You cannot establish that any other person experiences subjectivity. Thus you cannot demonstrate even to yourself that you experience subjectivity because it is impossible to have a control, an externally verifiable example of subjective consciousness. If you cannot demonstrate to yourself that you are conscious, then there is no riddle of consciousness. And if you cannot establish a standard for discriminating consciousness, there is no way you can exclude the possibility that its visible expressions can be modeled in purely physical systems. Arguments by assertion of the specialness of human consciousness keep appearing on HN like clockwork.